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Incomplete Contracts and Investment : A Study of Land Tenancy in Pakistan

When contracts are incomplete, relationship-specific investments may be underprovided due to the threat of opportunistic expropriation or holdup. The authors find evidence of such underinvestment on tenanted land in rural Pakistan. Using data from households cultivating multiple plots under differen...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Jacoby, Hanan G., Mansuri, Ghazala
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:
ADVERSE SELECTION
AGRICULTURAL LAND
AGRICULTURE
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
CONTRACT THEORY
CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS
COST FUNCTIONS
CREDIT
DISCOUNT RATE
DISECONOMIES OF SCALE
EVICTION
EXPROPRIATION
HOUSEHOLDS
HUMAN CAPITAL
INCENTIVE EFFECTS
INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS
INEFFICIENCY
INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR
INVESTMENT INCENTIVES
LAND TENURE
LANDLORD
LANDLORDS
LANDOWNERS
LEASE
LEASING
LIABILITY
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION
MORAL HAZARD
OPPORTUNITY COST
OPTIMAL CONTRACT
PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY
PRODUCTION FUNCTION
PROPERTY RIGHTS
RENTS
RETURN ON INVESTMENT
RISK
RISK AVERSION
RISK-NEUTRAL
STATEMENTS
TENANCY
TENANTS
WEALTH
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/02/6541576/incomplete-contracts-investment-study-land-tenancy-pakistan
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8825

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/02/6541576/incomplete-contracts-investment-study-land-tenancy-pakistan
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8825

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