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Incentives, Supervision, and Sharecropper Productivity

Although sharecropping has long fascinated economists, the determinants of this contractual form are still poorly understood and the debate over the extent of moral hazard is far from settled. The authors address both issues by emphasizing the role...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Jacoby, Hanan G., Mansuri, Ghazala
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:
ADVERSE SELECTION
AGRICULTURE
CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE
DIMINISHING RETURNS
EVICTION
HOUSEHOLDS
INCREASING RETURNS
INEFFICIENCY
LAND OWNERSHIP
LAND REFORM
LANDLORD
LANDLORDS
LANDOWNERS
LEASING
LIABILITY
MORAL HAZARD
POINTS
PRODUCTIVITY
PRODUCTIVITY INCREASES
PROPERTY RIGHTS
RENTS
RISK AVERSE
RISK AVERSION
RISK NEUTRAL
TENANCY
TENANTS
TENURE
TYPES OF CONTRACTS
VALUE OF OUTPUT
VILLAGES
WEALTH
YIELD
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/02/7351778/incentives-supervision-sharecropper-productivity
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7128

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/02/7351778/incentives-supervision-sharecropper-productivity
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7128

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