Teacher Performance Pay : Experimental Evidence from Pakistan
This paper presents evidence from the first three years of a randomized controlled trial of a government-administered pilot teacher performance pay program in Punjab, Pakistan. The program offers yearly cash bonuses to teachers in a sample of publi...
Main Authors: | , |
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Language: | English en_US |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2015
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/06/24638080/teacher-performance-pay-experimental-evidence-pakistan http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22180 |
Summary: | This paper presents evidence from the
first three years of a randomized controlled trial of a
government-administered pilot teacher performance pay
program in Punjab, Pakistan. The program offers yearly cash
bonuses to teachers in a sample of public primary schools
with the lowest mean student exam scores in the province.
Bonuses are linked to three school-level indicators: the
gain in student exam scores, the gain in school enrollment,
and the level of student exam participation. Bonus receipt
and size are also randomly assigned across schools according
to whether or not the teacher is the school’s head. On
average, the program increases school enrollment by 4.1
percent and student exam participation rates by 3.4
percentage points, both in the third year. The analysis does
not find that the program increases student exam scores in
any year. Mean impacts are similar across program variants.
The positive mean impact on school enrollment is mainly seen
in urban schools and the positive mean impact on student
exam participation rates is only seen in rural schools. |
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