Nash Equilibria of Games When Players' Preferences Are Quasi-Transitive
Much of game theory is founded on the assumption that individual players are endowed with preferences that can be represented by a real-valued utility function. However, in reality human preferences are often not transitive. This is especially true...
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank Group, Washington, DC
2014
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/09/20211385/nash-equilibria-games-players-preferences-quasi-transitive http://hdl.handle.net/10986/20373 |
| Summary: | Much of game theory is founded on the
assumption that individual players are endowed with
preferences that can be represented by a real-valued utility
function. However, in reality human preferences are often
not transitive. This is especially true for the indifference
relation, which can lead an individual to make a series of
choices which in their totality would be viewed as erroneous
by the same individual. There is a substantial literature
that raises intricate questions about individual liberty and
the role of government intervention in such contexts. The
aim of this paper is not to go into these ethical matters
but to provide a formal structure for such analysis by
characterizing games where individual preferences are
quasi-transitive. The paper identifies a set of axioms which
are sufficient for the existence of Nash equilibria in such 'games.' |
|---|