Donor Fragmentation and Bureaucratic Quality in Aid Recipients
This paper analyzes the impact of donor fragmentation on the quality of government bureaucracy in aid-recipient nations. A formal model of a donor's decision to hire government administrators to manage donor-funded projects predicts that the n...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, D.C.
2013
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/01/2879345/donor-fragmentation-bureaucratic-quality-aid-recipients http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14201 |
| Summary: | This paper analyzes the impact of donor
fragmentation on the quality of government bureaucracy in
aid-recipient nations. A formal model of a donor's
decision to hire government administrators to manage
donor-funded projects predicts that the number of
administrators hired declines as the donor's share of
other projects in the country increases, and as the
donor's "altruism" (concern for the success
of other donors' projects) increases. These hypotheses
are supported by cross-country empirical tests using an
index of bureaucratic quality available for aid-recipient
nations over the 1982-2001 period. Declines in bureaucratic
quality are associated with higher donor fragmentation
(reflecting the presence of many donors, each with a small
share of aid), and with smaller shares of aid coming from
multilateral agencies, a proxy for donor "altruism." |
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