The Quality of Foreign Aid: Country Selectivity or Donors Incentives?
The author investigates the determinants of foreign aid quality. He shows that design effects are a crucial component of quality. He thus establishes that donors have an impact on the quality of the foreign assistance they provide. The author also...
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| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, D.C.
2013
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/06/4983704/quality-foreign-aid-country-selectivity-or-donors-incentives http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14001 |
| Summary: | The author investigates the determinants
of foreign aid quality. He shows that design effects are a
crucial component of quality. He thus establishes that
donors have an impact on the quality of the foreign
assistance they provide. The author also shows both
theoretically and empirically that the quality of aid is
endogenous to the relationship between the donor agency and
the recipient government. Highly capable and accountable
governments accept only well-designed projects, whereas
governments with low accountability may accept poor quality
projects either because they are unable to assess the worth
of the projects or they will benefit personally. |
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