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|a Krimmer, Robert.
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|a Electronic Voting :
|b 7th International Joint Conference, e-Vote-ID 2022, Bregenz, Austria, October 4-7, 2022, Proceedings.
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|a 1st ed.
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|a Cham :
|b Springer International Publishing AG,
|c 2022.
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|c ©2022.
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|a 1 online resource (197 pages)
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|a text
|b txt
|2 rdacontent
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|a computer
|b c
|2 rdamedia
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|a online resource
|b cr
|2 rdacarrier
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|a Lecture Notes in Computer Science Series ;
|v v.13553
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|a Intro -- Preface -- Organization -- Contents -- An Analysis of the Security and Privacy Issues of the Neovote Online Voting System -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Legal and Regulatory Constraints in France -- 3 Claims and Transparency -- 4 Code Re-use from Asmcrypto -- 4.1 General Copy -- 4.2 RSAES-PKCS -- 5 Publishing the Tally -- 6 Vote Verification -- 6.1 Availability of the Verification Process -- 6.2 Attacking the Ballot Box -- 6.3 Deanonymising the Votes -- 7 Discussion -- 8 Conclusion -- References -- Time, Privacy, Robustness, Accuracy: Trade-Offs for the Open Vote Network Protocol -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 Notations -- 2.2 Open Vote Network (OV-Net) -- 2.3 Denial of Service -- 3 Parallel OV-Net -- 4 Parallel OV-Net DoS Resilience -- 5 Tally-Combining Algorithms -- 5.1 Comparing Tally-Combining Algorithms -- 6 Privacy of Parallel OV-Net -- 6.1 Definitions and Assumptions -- 6.2 Basic Cases: M=k=1 and M 1, k=1 -- 6.3 General Case -- 7 Conclusions and Further Research -- References -- Review Your Choices: When Confirmation Pages Break Ballot Secrecy in Online Elections -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background and Related Work -- 3 Research Question and Scope -- 3.1 Vendor Demo Access Requests -- 4 Description of Simply Voting's System -- 4.1 Ballot Casting Process -- 4.2 Potential Side-channel Attacks in the Ballot Casting Process -- 5 Methodology -- 5.1 Testing a Length-Based Side-channel Attack -- 5.2 Technical Implementation of the Client Application -- 5.3 Technical Implementation of the Server Application -- 6 Experiment 1 (Single Contest): Township of Selwyn, Ward Lakefield -- 6.1 Data Collection -- 6.2 Data Analysis -- 7 Additional Experiments -- 7.1 Experiment 2 (Two Contests): Township of Selwyn, Ward Ennismore -- 7.2 Experiment 3 (Three Contests): Town of Ajax, Ward 1 -- 8 Mitigations.
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|a 8.1 Client-Side Confirmation Page Generation -- 8.2 Fixed-Length Responses -- 8.3 Uniformly Random-Length Padding in Response Header -- 8.4 Padding from a Gaussian Distribution -- 8.5 Discussion and Conclusion -- References -- Running the Race: A Swiss Voting Story -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 The Swiss Post Protocol -- 1.2 Outline -- 2 The Requirements -- 2.1 Comments on the Requirements -- 3 The Specification and Proofs -- 3.1 The Protocol Specification is too Narrow -- 3.2 The Roles and Channels are Incompletely Aligned with the VEleS -- 4 The Bugs -- 4.1 Lack of Authentication: Attack on Individual Verifiability -- 4.2 Lack of Details in Handling Inconsistencies: Attack on Individual Verifiability -- 4.3 Lack of ZK Proofs of Correct Key Generation: Attack on Privacy -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- The Effect of Exogenous Shocks on the Administration of Online Voting: Evidence from Ontario, Canada -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Context: Municipal Elections in Canada -- 2.1 The 2018 Technical Incident -- 2.2 The COVID-19 Pandemic -- 3 Literature Review -- 4 Data and Methods -- 5 Results -- 5.1 The 2018 Technical Incident -- 5.2 Do Effects Differ Across Municipal Types? -- 5.3 Open Ended Responses and Focus Group Insights -- 6 Discussion and Concluding Thoughts -- References -- The Council of Europe's CM/Rec(2017)5 on e-voting and Secret Suffrage: Time for yet Another Update? -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Council of Europe's Rec(2017)5 -- 2.1 The First Council of Europe's Standards on e-voting -- 2.2 The Road Towards Updated Rec(2017)5 -- 3 Secret Suffrage in Rec(2017)5 -- 3.1 Secret Suffrage: Section IV -- 3.2 Beyond Section IV -- 4 Time for yet Another Update? -- 4.1 The Need for a Clearer Scope -- 4.2 The Need for a New Approach -- 4.3 The Need for an Update? -- 5 Conclusions -- References.
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|a Sweeter than SUITE: Supermartingale Stratified Union-Intersection Tests of Elections -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Past Work -- 3 Stratified Audits -- 3.1 Assorters and Assertions -- 3.2 Stratified Comparison Audits -- 3.3 Union-intersection Tests -- 3.4 Combining Functions -- 3.5 Intersection Supermartingales -- 3.6 Within-Stratum P-values -- 3.7 Sequential Stratum Selection -- 4 Evaluations -- 4.1 Combination and Allocation Rules -- 4.2 Comparison to SUITE -- 4.3 A Highly Stratified Audit -- 5 Discussion -- A Computational details -- B Data and Code -- References -- They May Look and Look, Yet Not See: BMDs Cannot be Tested Adequately -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Prior Work -- 3 How Much Testing is Enough? -- 3.1 Threats and Defenses -- 3.2 Jurisdiction Sizes, Contest Sizes, and Margins -- 3.3 Voting Transactions -- 4 Passive Testing -- 4.1 Targeting Vulnerable Voters -- 4.2 FUD Attacks on Passive testing -- 5 LAT and Parallel Testing -- 5.1 Lower Bounds on the Difficulty of Parallel Testing -- 5.2 Building a Model of Voter behavior -- 6 Complications -- 7 Conclusion -- References -- Individual Verifiability with Return Codes: Manipulation Detection Efficacy -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Related Work -- 3 Background -- 3.1 Swiss Electronic Voting System -- 3.2 E-Vote-ID-2021-Proposal -- 4 Improvements to E-Vote-ID-2021-Proposal and Descriptive Video -- 4.1 Improvements to the Voting Material and User Interfaces -- 4.2 Descriptive Video -- 5 Methodology -- 5.1 Research Questions, Hypotheses -- 5.2 Considered Manipulation-Types -- 5.3 Study Procedure -- 5.4 Ethics, Data Protection, Recruitment -- 6 Results -- 6.1 Overall Manipulation Detection -- 6.2 Manipulation Detection for Various Subgroups -- 6.3 Video Related Statements -- 7 Discussion -- 8 Conclusion -- References -- Logic and Accuracy Testing: A Fifty-State Review -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background -- 2.1 L&.
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|a A Testing Goals -- 2.2 U.S. Elections -- 2.3 Related Work -- 3 Methodology -- 3.1 Data Collection -- 3.2 Evaluation Criteria -- 4 Analysis -- 4.1 Performance by Criterion -- 4.2 Performance by State -- 5 Discussion -- 6 Conclusion -- A State-by-State Practices -- References -- Author Index.
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|a Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
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| 590 |
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|a Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2023. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
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| 655 |
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|a Electronic books.
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| 700 |
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|a Volkamer, Melanie.
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| 700 |
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|a Duenas-Cid, David.
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| 700 |
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|a Rønne, Peter.
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| 700 |
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|a Germann, Micha.
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|i Print version:
|a Krimmer, Robert
|t Electronic Voting
|d Cham : Springer International Publishing AG,c2022
|z 9783031159107
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| 797 |
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|a ProQuest (Firm)
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| 830 |
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|a Lecture Notes in Computer Science Series
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| 856 |
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|u https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/matrademy/detail.action?docID=7080214
|z Click to View
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