Electronic Voting : 7th International Joint Conference, e-Vote-ID 2022, Bregenz, Austria, October 4-7, 2022, Proceedings.
Main Author: | |
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Other Authors: | , , , |
Format: | eBook |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Cham :
Springer International Publishing AG,
2022.
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Edition: | 1st ed. |
Series: | Lecture Notes in Computer Science Series
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Click to View |
Table of Contents:
- Intro
- Preface
- Organization
- Contents
- An Analysis of the Security and Privacy Issues of the Neovote Online Voting System
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Legal and Regulatory Constraints in France
- 3 Claims and Transparency
- 4 Code Re-use from Asmcrypto
- 4.1 General Copy
- 4.2 RSAES-PKCS
- 5 Publishing the Tally
- 6 Vote Verification
- 6.1 Availability of the Verification Process
- 6.2 Attacking the Ballot Box
- 6.3 Deanonymising the Votes
- 7 Discussion
- 8 Conclusion
- References
- Time, Privacy, Robustness, Accuracy: Trade-Offs for the Open Vote Network Protocol
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Notations
- 2.2 Open Vote Network (OV-Net)
- 2.3 Denial of Service
- 3 Parallel OV-Net
- 4 Parallel OV-Net DoS Resilience
- 5 Tally-Combining Algorithms
- 5.1 Comparing Tally-Combining Algorithms
- 6 Privacy of Parallel OV-Net
- 6.1 Definitions and Assumptions
- 6.2 Basic Cases: M=k=1 and M 1, k=1
- 6.3 General Case
- 7 Conclusions and Further Research
- References
- Review Your Choices: When Confirmation Pages Break Ballot Secrecy in Online Elections
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background and Related Work
- 3 Research Question and Scope
- 3.1 Vendor Demo Access Requests
- 4 Description of Simply Voting's System
- 4.1 Ballot Casting Process
- 4.2 Potential Side-channel Attacks in the Ballot Casting Process
- 5 Methodology
- 5.1 Testing a Length-Based Side-channel Attack
- 5.2 Technical Implementation of the Client Application
- 5.3 Technical Implementation of the Server Application
- 6 Experiment 1 (Single Contest): Township of Selwyn, Ward Lakefield
- 6.1 Data Collection
- 6.2 Data Analysis
- 7 Additional Experiments
- 7.1 Experiment 2 (Two Contests): Township of Selwyn, Ward Ennismore
- 7.2 Experiment 3 (Three Contests): Town of Ajax, Ward 1
- 8 Mitigations.
- 8.1 Client-Side Confirmation Page Generation
- 8.2 Fixed-Length Responses
- 8.3 Uniformly Random-Length Padding in Response Header
- 8.4 Padding from a Gaussian Distribution
- 8.5 Discussion and Conclusion
- References
- Running the Race: A Swiss Voting Story
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 The Swiss Post Protocol
- 1.2 Outline
- 2 The Requirements
- 2.1 Comments on the Requirements
- 3 The Specification and Proofs
- 3.1 The Protocol Specification is too Narrow
- 3.2 The Roles and Channels are Incompletely Aligned with the VEleS
- 4 The Bugs
- 4.1 Lack of Authentication: Attack on Individual Verifiability
- 4.2 Lack of Details in Handling Inconsistencies: Attack on Individual Verifiability
- 4.3 Lack of ZK Proofs of Correct Key Generation: Attack on Privacy
- 5 Conclusion
- References
- The Effect of Exogenous Shocks on the Administration of Online Voting: Evidence from Ontario, Canada
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Context: Municipal Elections in Canada
- 2.1 The 2018 Technical Incident
- 2.2 The COVID-19 Pandemic
- 3 Literature Review
- 4 Data and Methods
- 5 Results
- 5.1 The 2018 Technical Incident
- 5.2 Do Effects Differ Across Municipal Types?
- 5.3 Open Ended Responses and Focus Group Insights
- 6 Discussion and Concluding Thoughts
- References
- The Council of Europe's CM/Rec(2017)5 on e-voting and Secret Suffrage: Time for yet Another Update?
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Council of Europe's Rec(2017)5
- 2.1 The First Council of Europe's Standards on e-voting
- 2.2 The Road Towards Updated Rec(2017)5
- 3 Secret Suffrage in Rec(2017)5
- 3.1 Secret Suffrage: Section IV
- 3.2 Beyond Section IV
- 4 Time for yet Another Update?
- 4.1 The Need for a Clearer Scope
- 4.2 The Need for a New Approach
- 4.3 The Need for an Update?
- 5 Conclusions
- References.
- Sweeter than SUITE: Supermartingale Stratified Union-Intersection Tests of Elections
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Past Work
- 3 Stratified Audits
- 3.1 Assorters and Assertions
- 3.2 Stratified Comparison Audits
- 3.3 Union-intersection Tests
- 3.4 Combining Functions
- 3.5 Intersection Supermartingales
- 3.6 Within-Stratum P-values
- 3.7 Sequential Stratum Selection
- 4 Evaluations
- 4.1 Combination and Allocation Rules
- 4.2 Comparison to SUITE
- 4.3 A Highly Stratified Audit
- 5 Discussion
- A Computational details
- B Data and Code
- References
- They May Look and Look, Yet Not See: BMDs Cannot be Tested Adequately
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Prior Work
- 3 How Much Testing is Enough?
- 3.1 Threats and Defenses
- 3.2 Jurisdiction Sizes, Contest Sizes, and Margins
- 3.3 Voting Transactions
- 4 Passive Testing
- 4.1 Targeting Vulnerable Voters
- 4.2 FUD Attacks on Passive testing
- 5 LAT and Parallel Testing
- 5.1 Lower Bounds on the Difficulty of Parallel Testing
- 5.2 Building a Model of Voter behavior
- 6 Complications
- 7 Conclusion
- References
- Individual Verifiability with Return Codes: Manipulation Detection Efficacy
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Related Work
- 3 Background
- 3.1 Swiss Electronic Voting System
- 3.2 E-Vote-ID-2021-Proposal
- 4 Improvements to E-Vote-ID-2021-Proposal and Descriptive Video
- 4.1 Improvements to the Voting Material and User Interfaces
- 4.2 Descriptive Video
- 5 Methodology
- 5.1 Research Questions, Hypotheses
- 5.2 Considered Manipulation-Types
- 5.3 Study Procedure
- 5.4 Ethics, Data Protection, Recruitment
- 6 Results
- 6.1 Overall Manipulation Detection
- 6.2 Manipulation Detection for Various Subgroups
- 6.3 Video Related Statements
- 7 Discussion
- 8 Conclusion
- References
- Logic and Accuracy Testing: A Fifty-State Review
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background
- 2.1 L&.
- A Testing Goals
- 2.2 U.S. Elections
- 2.3 Related Work
- 3 Methodology
- 3.1 Data Collection
- 3.2 Evaluation Criteria
- 4 Analysis
- 4.1 Performance by Criterion
- 4.2 Performance by State
- 5 Discussion
- 6 Conclusion
- A State-by-State Practices
- References
- Author Index.