Agency Theory : A Structured Approach to Writing Contracts.

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Stremitzer, Alexander.
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Frankfurt a.M. : Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften, 2004.
Edition:1st ed.
Series:Forschungsergebnisse der Wirtschaftsuniversitaet Wien Series
Subjects:
Online Access:Click to View
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100 1 |a Stremitzer, Alexander. 
245 1 0 |a Agency Theory :  |b A Structured Approach to Writing Contracts. 
250 |a 1st ed. 
264 1 |a Frankfurt a.M. :  |b Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften,  |c 2004. 
264 4 |c Ã2005. 
300 |a 1 online resource (246 pages) 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
490 1 |a Forschungsergebnisse der Wirtschaftsuniversitaet Wien Series ;  |v v.3 
505 0 |a Cover -- I INTRODUCTION -- 1 The Contracting Problem -- 2 Applications -- 3 Models of Contracting -- 4 Obsession with Modeling Single Effects -- 5 Methodological Reflection -- 6 A Note to the Reader -- II EPISTEMIC PROBLEMS AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE -- 1 Overview -- 2 The Objectives of Science -- 3 What makes Science scientific? -- 4 Absolute Justification -- 4.1 Basic Concepts of Cognition -- 4.2 Strategies to derive scientific statements -- 4.2.1 Introduction -- 4.2.2 Inductivism -- 4.2.3 Pragmatism - Foundation by Method -- 4.2.4 Falsificationism -- 4.2.5 Conclusion -- 5 Beyond Absolute Justification -- 5.1 Against Scepticism -- 5.2 Dogmatism -- 5.3 Common Sense -- 5.4 An Axiomatic Approach -- 6 The First Principle: Its Cognitive Status -- 6.1 Consequences of Relativism -- 6.2 Overcoming Relativism -- 7 Methodological Implications -- III THE METHOD OF ECONOMICS AND CONTRACT THEORY -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Overview -- 3 Instrumentalism vs. Realism -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Natural vs. Social Sciences -- 4 Methodological Individualism -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Rational Choice -- 4.2.1 Choice under Certainty -- 4.2.2 Choice under Uncertainty -- 4.3 A Remark on Game Theory -- 4.4 Defending Rational Choice on Normative Grounds -- 4.5 Economics as a Formal vs. Real Science -- 4.6 Realism of Assumptions -- 4.7 Defending Homo Oeconomicus -- 4.7.1 Introduction -- 4.7.2 Relevant Situations -- 4.7.3 Scope of Concepts -- 4.7.4 Robustness - Worst Case -- 4.7.5 Instrumentalism in Modeling -- 4.8 Bounded Rationality vs. Unconscious Rationality -- 4.8.1 Introduction -- 4.8.2 The Evolutionary Mechanism -- 4.8.3 Method of Evolutionary Economics -- 4.9 Piecemeal Social Engineering -- 4.10 Objection of Historicism -- 5&lt -- tab/&gt -- Introspection in Economics -- 5.1 Internal dimension and Instability -- 5.2 Blackboxing vs. Qualitative Method. 
505 8 |a 5.3 Heuristic or Independent Source? -- 5.4 The Hermeneutical Method and a priorism -- 6 Empirical Methods -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Reviving Monism -- 6.2.1 Theory of Revealed Preferences -- 6.2.2 Panphysicalism -- 6.3 Interviews -- 6.4 Controlled Experiment -- 6.5 Econometrics - Historical Experiment -- 6.6 Informal evidence -- 6.7 The Problem of Aggregation -- 6.8 Macro modeling: Beyond Methodological Individualism -- 6.9 Verificationism vs. Falsifications: A Normative Evaluation -- 7 Applied Microeconomics -- 7.1 Applied Microeconomics as an Art -- 7.2 Convergence of Applied Microeconomics and BWL -- 8 Model of Optimal Contract Design -- 8.1 Economics of Institutions -- 8.2 Solving for the Optimal Contract -- 8.3 The Rationale for the Micro-foundation -- 8.4 A Structured Approach -- 9 Practical Life and Theory -- IV ANALYTICAL AGENCY MODELS -- 1 Overview -- 2 The Classical Risk-Incentive Trade-Off -- 2.1 The Basic Model -- 2.1.1 Introduction -- 2.1.2 Modeling Assumptions -- 2.1.3 Contractible Effort -- 2.1.4 Uncontractible Effort -- 2.1.5 Discussion -- 2.2 Risk-Incentive Trade-off for Linear Contracts -- 2.2.1 Introduction -- 2.2.2 Modeling Assumptions -- 2.2.3 The Model -- 2.2.4 Discussion -- 2.2.5 Appendix -- 2.3 Risk Sharing -- 2.3.1 Introduction -- 2.3.2 The Model -- 2.3.3 Model Extension: Diversification -- 2.3.4 Discussion -- 2.4 The Optimal Contract -- 2.4.1 Introduction -- 2.4.2 Mechanics of the Optimal Sharing Rule -- 2.4.3 The Case for Linear Contracts -- 2.4.4 Valuable Information -- 2.4.5 Discussion -- 2.5 Limitations and Extensions -- 3 Error in judgement, Bankruptcy -- 3.1 Input Monitoring -- 3.1.1 Introduction -- 3.1.2 Modeling Assumptions -- 3.1.3 Absence of both Error and Bankruptcy Constraint -- 3.1.4 Bankruptcy constraint -- 3.1.5 Extension: The role of Agent Risk Averseness -- 3.1.6 Presence of Error -- 3.1.7 Discussion. 
505 8 |a 3.2 Output Monitoring -- 3.2.1 Introduction -- 3.2.2 Shifting Support -- 3.2.3 Moral Hazard with respect to Risk -- 3.2.4 Discussion -- 4 Transaction Cost, Bonding, Distortion -- 4.1 Transaction Cost and Bonding -- 4.2 Distortion -- 4.2.1 Introduction -- 4.2.2 The Model -- 4.2.3 Discussion -- 5 Dynamic Extensions -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Income smoothing -- 5.2.1 Introduction -- 5.2.2 The Model -- 5.2.3 Discussion -- 5.3 Reputation Effects in Supergames -- 5.3.1 Introduction -- 5.3.2 Observable but Uncontractible Effort -- 5.3.3 Observable but Uncontractible Output -- 5.3.4 Reinterpretation of the Discount rate -- 5.3.5 A Multiparty Extension -- 5.3.6 Discussion -- 5.4 Career Concerns - Learning -- 5.4.1 Introduction -- 5.4.2 The Basic Model -- 5.4.3 Extension: Adding Innovation -- 5.4.4 Disequilibrium - Transient Effects -- 5.4.5 Discussion -- V CONCLUSIONS -- 1.1 Results -- 1.2 Checklist -- 1.3 Outlook. 
588 |a Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources. 
590 |a Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2023. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.  
655 4 |a Electronic books. 
776 0 8 |i Print version:  |a Stremitzer, Alexander  |t Agency Theory: Methodology, Analysis  |d Frankfurt a.M. : Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften,c2004  |z 9783631529737 
797 2 |a ProQuest (Firm) 
830 0 |a Forschungsergebnisse der Wirtschaftsuniversitaet Wien Series 
856 4 0 |u https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/matrademy/detail.action?docID=30685986  |z Click to View