Goal-independent central banks why politicians decide to delegate /
Main Author: | Crowe, Christopher. |
---|---|
Corporate Author: | ProQuest (Firm) |
Format: | Electronic eBook |
Language: | English |
Published: |
[Washington, D.C.] :
International Monetary Fund,
2006.
|
Series: | IMF working paper ;
WP/06/256. |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Click to View |
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