Holdings: Bureaucratic Delegation and Political Institutions : When Are Independent Central Banks Irrelevent?

Cover Image

QR Code

Bureaucratic Delegation and Political Institutions : When Are Independent Central Banks Irrelevent?

The government's ability to credibly commit to policy announcements is critical to the successful implementation of economic policies as diverse as capital taxation and utilities regulation. One frequently advocated means of signaling credible...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Keefer, Philip, Stasavage, David
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:	ACTUAL INFLATION BORROWING CENTRAL BANK CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE CENTRAL BANK LENDING CENTRAL BANKS COMPETITION POLICY CONSUMER PRICE INDEX DECISION MAKING DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DISCRETIONARY MONETARY POLICY ECONOMIC POLICIES ECONOMICS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EXPECTED VALUE EXPECTED VALUES GDP IMPORTS INCOME INDEPENDENT CENTRAL BANK INFLATION INFLATION PREFERENCES INFLATION RATE IRREVERSIBILITY LEGISLATION LOW INFLATION LOWER INFLATION MONETARY POLICY MONEY SUPPLY POLICY DECISIONS POLICY MAKERS PRICE INCREASES PRICE INFLATION RATE OF INFLATION TAXATION
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/06/437170/bureaucratic-delegation-political-institutions-independent-central-banks-irrelevent http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19842

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/06/437170/bureaucratic-delegation-political-institutions-independent-central-banks-irrelevent
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19842