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Development and the Interaction of Enforcement Institutions

The authors examine how institutions that enforce contracts between two parties-producers and consumers-interact in a competitive market with one-sided asymmetric information and productivity shocks. They compare an informal enforcement mechanism, reputation, the efficacy of which is enhanced by con...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Dhillon, Amrita, Rigolini, Jamele
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:
ADVERSE SELECTION
AGENTS
AGRICULTURE
APPLICATIONS
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
CONSUMERS
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
DISCOUNT RATE
ECONOMETRICS
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
EQUILIBRIUM
EQUILIBRIUM PRICES
EXPECTED UTILITY
EXPORTS
FIXED COSTS
FREE ENTRY
FUTURE RESEARCH
IMPERFECT INFORMATION
MARGINAL COST
MARGINAL COSTS
MARKET FORCES
MARKET SHARE
MORAL HAZARD
NASH EQUILIBRIUM
POLITICAL ECONOMY
PREMIUMS
PRICE COMPETITION
PRISONERS DILEMMA
PRODUCT MARKETS
PRODUCT QUALITY
PRODUCTIVITY
PROPERTY RIGHTS
SAVINGS
SPREAD
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
SUBSTITUTE
SUNK COSTS
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/12/7259034/development-interaction-enforcement-institutions
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9280

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/12/7259034/development-interaction-enforcement-institutions
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9280

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