Holdings: Political Accountability and Regulatory Performance in Infrastructure Industries: An Empirical Analysis

Political Accountability and Regulatory Performance in Infrastructure Industries: An Empirical Analysis

The aim of this paper is to empirically explore the relationship between the quality of political institutions and the performance of regulation, an issue that has recently occupied much of the policy debate on the effectiveness of infrastructure industry reforms. Taking the view that political acco...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Gasmi, Farid, Noumba Um, Paul, Virto, Laura Recuero
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:	ACCOUNTABILITY VARIABLES ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ASYMPTOTICALLY EQUIVALENT AUTHORITY AUTOCORRELATION BUREAUCRACY CAUSATION CITIZENS COEFFICIENTS COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS CURRENCY RISK DATA ANALYSIS DEMOCRACY DEPENDENT VARIABLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS DYNAMIC STRUCTURE ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC INCENTIVES ELECTRICITY SECTOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ENDOGENOUS REGRESSORS ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES ERROR ERROR TERM EXPLANATORY VARIABLES FINITE SAMPLE FIXED EFFECTS GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNANCE GOODNESS-OF-FIT GOVERNANCE DIMENSIONS GOVERNMENT MONOPOLIES GRANGER-CAUSE GRANGER-CAUSES GROWTH PERFORMANCE HUMAN CAPITAL HYPOTHESES INDEPENDENT REGULATOR INDEPENDENT VARIABLES INFRASTRUCTURE INDUSTRIES INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES JUDICIARY LAG LENGTH LATIN AMERICAN LOCAL ACCOUNTABILITY MARKET ECONOMIES MEASUREMENT ERRORS MOMENT CONDITIONS 0 HYPOTHESIS NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS OUTLIERS PANEL DATA PERFORMANCE TARGETS POLICY IMPLICATIONS POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL STRUCTURES POLITICIANS PRECISION PREDICTABILITY PRIVATIZATION PUBLIC OFFICIALS REGULATORS REGULATORY AGENCIES REGULATORY DECISIONS REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS REGULATORY GOVERNANCE REGULATORY INCENTIVES REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS REGULATORY PERFORMANCE REGULATORY POLICIES REGULATORY PROCEDURES REGULATORY PROCESS REGULATORY PROCESSES REGULATORY RULES REGULATORY STRUCTURE REGULATORY STRUCTURES REPRESENTATIVES SET OF VARIABLES SOCIAL WELFARE STANDARD ERRORS STOCHASTIC PROCESS TELEPHONE SERVICE TIME PERIOD TIME TREND TIME-SERIES TRANSPARENCY UNIT ROOT VALIDITY VETO
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/12/7296583/political-accountability-regulatory-performance-infrastructure-industries-empirical-analysis http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8943

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http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/12/7296583/political-accountability-regulatory-performance-infrastructure-industries-empirical-analysis
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8943

Political Accountability and Regulatory Performance in Infrastructure Industries: An Empirical Analysis

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