Description: Environmental Federalism : A Panacea or Pandora’s Box for Developing Countries?

Environmental Federalism : A Panacea or Pandora’s Box for Developing Countries?

This paper provides new empirical evidence to the debate on the optimal locus of power over environmental policymaking in developing countries. The authors develop a simple lobby group model with mobile capital. The model predicts that a decentralized institutional structure leads to weaker environm...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Fredriksson, Per G., Mani, Muthukumara, Wollscheid, Jim R.
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:	ABATEMENT ABATEMENT COSTS ACCOUNTABILITY AIR POLLUTION ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AUTONOMY BENCHMARK CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CAPITAL FLIGHT CAPITAL FLOWS CLEAN WATER CONSERVATION CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE DECENTRALIZATION DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVOLUTION DIRECT INVESTMENT DUMPING ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC COMPETITION ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC POLICIES EFFECTIVE USE EMISSION EMISSION REDUCTION EMISSIONS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ENFORCEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES ENVIRONMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS ENVIRONMENTAL KUZNETS ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY FRAMEWORK ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARD ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY ENVIRONMENTALISM ENVIRONMENTALISTS EQUILIBRIUM EXOGENOUS VARIABLES EXPORTS EXPOSURE TO POLLUTION FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISHERIES FOREIGN COMPETITION FORESTRY FREE TRADE GDP GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY IMPORTS INCOME INDUSTRIAL PLANTS INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION INFLATION INFORMAL REGULATION INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAWS LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MARGINAL PRODUCT MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY MARGINAL PRODUCTS MARGINAL SOCIAL DAMAGE MUNICIPALITIES NASH EQUILIBRIUM NATURAL RESOURCE NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT NATURAL RESOURCES NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT NITROGEN OXIDES POLICY DECISIONS POLICY FRAMEWORK POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL PRESSURE POLLUTION CONTROL POLLUTION DAMAGE POLLUTION LEVELS POLLUTION MANAGEMENT POLLUTION REGULATION PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SERVICES PURCHASING POWER REGULATORY COMPLIANCE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT SAVINGS SCARCE CAPITAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT SUSTAINABLE GROWTH SUSTAINABLE USE TAXATION THEORETICAL MODELS TOTAL OUTPUT TRADE LIBERALIZATION UTILITY FUNCTIONS WASTE WASTE MANAGEMENT WATER POLLUTION WATER QUALITY
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/02/6596734/environmental-federalism-panacea-or-pandoras-box-developing-countries http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8738

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Summary:	This paper provides new empirical evidence to the debate on the optimal locus of power over environmental policymaking in developing countries. The authors develop a simple lobby group model with mobile capital. The model predicts that a decentralized institutional structure leads to weaker environmental policy due to more intensive lobbying by capital owners and workers. They test this prediction using novel cross-sectional developing country data. The results are consistent with the prediction of the model, in particular for air pollution policies. The authors also find that the effect of decentralization declines with a greater degree of trade openness. They believe this is the first developing country evidence on the environmental policy effects of federalism.

Environmental Federalism : A Panacea or Pandora’s Box for Developing Countries?

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