Political Leadership, Conflict, and the Prospects for Constitutional Peace
The emphasis on constitutional political economy has been that new rules and institutions can be devised that improve the welfare of a society. Given the number of societies that are infected with political conflict and, as a result, lower levels o...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/04/7524347/political-leadership-conflict-prospects-constitutional-peace http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7004 |
| Summary: | The emphasis on constitutional political
economy has been that new rules and institutions can be
devised that improve the welfare of a society. Given the
number of societies that are infected with political
conflict and, as a result, lower levels of welfare, this
paper attempts to analyze why we do not see more
constitutional conventions aimed at eliminating conflict.
The key idea is that expressively motivated group members
may create incentives for instrumentally motivated group
leaders such that it leads them to choose conflict rather
than compromise. Nonetheless, it is not argued that such a
peace is impossible to obtain. This leads to a further
question, that if such a constitutional agreement could be
found, would the expressive perspective alter the
conventional instrumental perspective on the sort of
constitutional reform that should be undertaken? |
|---|