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Political Alternation as a Restraint on Investing in Influence : Evidence from the Post-Communist Transition

The authors develop and implement a method for measuring the frequency of changes in power among distinct leaders and ideologically distinct parties that is comparable across political systems. The authors find that more frequent alternation in pow...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Milanovic, Branko, Hoff, Karla, Horowitz, Shale
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:
ACCOUNTABILITY
ASSASSINATION
AUTHORITARIANISM
AUTHORITY
BINDING CONSTRAINT
BRIBE
BRIBERY
BRIBES
CITIZENS
CIVIL SOCIETY
COALITIONS
COLLAPSE
COLLAPSES
COMMUNISM
COMMUNIST
COMMUNIST PARTY
COMPOSITE INDICATORS
CONFIDENCE
CONSTITUENCIES
CONSTITUENTS
CONSTITUTIONALISM
CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
CORRUPT
CORRUPTION
COUNTRY DUMMIES
COUNTRY FIXED EFFECT
COUNTRY FIXED EFFECTS
CREDIT RATING
CRIMINAL
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
CULTURAL IDENTITY
DECREE
DEMOCRACIES
DEMOCRACY
DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS
DEMOCRATIZATION
EAST EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
ECONOMIC REFORMS
ELECTION
ELECTIONS
ELECTORAL COMPETITION
ELECTORAL RULES
EMERGING MARKETS
FINANCIAL SUPPORT
FREE TRADE
GOOD GOVERNANCE
GOVERNANCE INDICATORS
GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS
GOVERNANCE MEASURE
GOVERNANCE MEASURES
GOVERNANCE OUTCOMES
GOVERNMENT ACTIONS
GOVERNMENT SERVICES
GRAND CORRUPTION
IDEOLOGIES
IMPROVING GOVERNANCE
INCOME LEVEL
INEQUALITY
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS
INTERNATIONAL MARKETS
INTERNATIONAL PEACE
JAIL
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
JUDICIARY
LABOR UNIONS
LAW INDEX
LAW INDICATOR
LAWS
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
LEGISLATION
LEGISLATURE
LIBERALIZATION
LIBERALIZATIONS
LOCAL LEVELS
LOWER HOUSE
MACROECONOMIC POLICY
MARKET ECONOMY
MEDIA
NATIONAL LEVEL
NATIONALISM
NATURAL RESOURCE
NATURAL RESOURCES
NEW MARKET
OWNERSHIP RIGHTS
PARLIAMENT
PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
PATRONAGE
PER CAPITA INCOME
PETTY CORRUPTION
POLICY ISSUES
POLITICAL CHANGE
POLITICAL COMPETITION
POLITICAL CORRUPTION
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POLITICAL INSTABILITY
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
POLITICAL LEADERS
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
POLITICAL MOBILIZATION
POLITICAL PARTIES
POLITICAL PARTY
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHER
POLITICAL POWER
POLITICAL POWERS
POLITICAL PROCESS
POLITICAL PROCESSES
POLITICAL REGIMES
POLITICAL RISK
POLITICAL STABILITY
POLITICAL SYSTEM
POLITICAL SYSTEMS
POLITICIAN
POLITICIANS
PREFERENTIAL
PREFERENTIAL ACCESS
PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT
PRESIDENCY
PRESIDENTS
PRIME MINISTER
PRIVATE GAIN
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
PRIVATIZATION
PROPERTY RIGHTS
PUBLIC FUNDING
RATE OF RETURN
REGIME CHANGE
REPUBLICS
RESOURCE CURSE
RULE OF LAW
SAFETY NETS
SANCTIONS
SEPARATION OF POWERS
SOCIALISM
STATE ASSETS
STATE CAPTURE
STATE CONTROL
STATE GOVERNMENT
STATE OWNERSHIP
STRONG GOVERNANCE
TAXATION
TRANSITION COUNTRIES
TRANSITION ECONOMIES
TURNOVER
TURNOVERS
UPPER HOUSE
URBANIZATION
URBANIZATION RATE
VETO
VETO POWER
WESTERN EUROPE
WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS
WORLD POLITICS
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/10/9911985/political-alternation-restraint-investing-influence-evidence-post-communist-transition
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6932

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/10/9911985/political-alternation-restraint-investing-influence-evidence-post-communist-transition
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6932

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