Joint Bidding in Infrastructure Procurement
To utilize public resources efficiently, it is required to take full advantage of competition in public procurement auctions. Joint bidding practices are one of the possible ways of facilitating auction competition. In theory, there are pros and co...
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/07/9669893/joint-bidding-infrastructure-procurement-joint-bidding-infrastructure-procurement http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6852 |
| Summary: | To utilize public resources efficiently,
it is required to take full advantage of competition in
public procurement auctions. Joint bidding practices are one
of the possible ways of facilitating auction competition. In
theory, there are pros and cons. It may enable firms to pool
their financial and experiential resources and remove
barriers to entry. On the other hand, it may reduce the
degree of competition and can be used as a cover for
collusive behavior. The paper empirically addresses whether
joint bidding is pro- or anti-competitive in Official
Development Assistance procurement auctions for
infrastructure projects. It reveals the possible risk of
relying too much on a foreign bidding coalition and may
suggest the necessity of overseeing it. The data reveal no
strong evidence that joint bidding practices are compatible
with competition policy, except for a few cases. In road
procurements, coalitional bidding involving both local and
foreign firms has been found pro-competitive. In the water
and sewage sector, local joint bidding may be useful to draw
out better offers from potential contractors. Joint bidding
composed of only foreign companies is mostly considered anti-competitive. |
|---|