The 2007 Meltdown in Structured Securitization : Searching for Lessons, Not Scapegoats
The intensity of recent turbulence in financial markets has surprised nearly everyone. This paper searches out the root causes of the crisis, distinguishing them from scapegoating explanations that have been used in policy circles to divert attenti...
Main Authors: | , , |
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Language: | English |
Published: |
Washington, DC: World Bank
2012
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/11/10053071/2007-meltdown-structured-securitization-searching-lessons-not-scapegoats http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6309 |
Summary: | The intensity of recent turbulence in
financial markets has surprised nearly everyone. This paper
searches out the root causes of the crisis, distinguishing
them from scapegoating explanations that have been used in
policy circles to divert attention from the underlying
breakdown of incentives. Incentive conflicts explain how
securitization went wrong, why credit ratings proved so
inaccurate, and why it is superficial to blame the crisis on
mark-to-market accounting, an unexpected loss of liquidity,
or trends in globalization and deregulation in financial
markets. The analysis finds disturbing implications of the
crisis for Basel II and its implementation. The paper argues
that the principal source of financial instability lies in
contradictory political and bureaucratic incentives that
undermine the effectiveness of financial regulation and
supervision in every country in the world. The paper
concludes by identifying reforms that would improve
incentives by increasing transparency and accountability in
government and industry alike. |
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