Short-run Learning Dynamics under a Test-based Accountability System : Evidence from Pakistan
Low student learning is a common finding in much of the developing world. This paper uses a relatively unique dataset of five semiannual rounds of standardized test data to characterize and explain the short-term changes in student learning. The da...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2012
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20101101161208 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3946 |
| Summary: | Low student learning is a common finding
in much of the developing world. This paper uses a
relatively unique dataset of five semiannual rounds of
standardized test data to characterize and explain the
short-term changes in student learning. The data are
collected as part of the quality assurance system for a
public-private partnership program that offers public
subsidies conditional on minimum learning levels to low-cost
private schools in Pakistan. Apart from a large positive
distributional shift in learning between the first two test
rounds, the learning distributions over test rounds show
little progress. Schools are ejected from the program if
they fail to achieve a minimum pass rate in the test in two
consecutive attempts, making the test high stakes. Sharp
regression discontinuity estimates show that the threat of
program exit on schools that barely failed the test for the
first time induces large learning gains. The large change in
learning between the first two test rounds is likely
attributable to this accountability pressure given that a
large share of new program entrants failed in the first test
round. Schools also qualify for substantial annual teacher
bonuses if they achieve a minimum score in a composite
measure of student test participation and mean test score.
Sharp regression discontinuity estimates do not show that
the prospect of future teacher bonus rewards induces
learning gains for schools that barely did not qualify for
the bonus. |
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