Private Cities : Implications for Urban Policy in Developing Countries

Institutional weaknesses limit the capacity of local governments to support efficient urbanization in developing countries. They also lead to the emergence of large developers with the clout to build entire cities. This paper analyzes the urbanizat...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Yue Li, Rama, Martin G.
Language:English
Published: Washington, DC: World Bank 2022
Subjects:
URBAN LAND; APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING; UNIVERSITY PRESS; MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY; PRIVATE INVESTOR; URBAN LAND DEVELOPMENT; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY; POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH; LOCAL PUBLIC GOOD; LAW AND ECONOMICS; COST OF LAND; BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT; AMOUNT OF LAND; REDISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCE; USE OF SUBSIDIES; DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTER; QUALITY OF PUBLIC; INCREASING GOVERNMENT CAPACITY; NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS; ALLOCATION OF RESOURCE; CONCENTRATION OF PEOPLE; INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION; LOCAL BUSINESS COMMUNITY; PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM SETTING; POLITICAL ECONOMY MODEL; FORM OF PRIVATIZATION; TYPES OF CITY; POLITICAL SCIENCE LITERATURE; URBANIZATION PROCESS; URBAN ECONOMICS; STRATEGIC CITY; URBAN POLICY; REACTION FUNCTION; URBAN DEVELOPMENT; RURAL AREA; URBAN AGGLOMERATION; PROPERTY RIGHT; ADVANCED ECONOMY; MAXIMUM RETURN; LUMP-SUM TAX; SOCIAL OPTIMUM; REGIONAL SCIENCE; INSTITUTIONAL FEATURE; PRIVATE ACTOR; URBAN AUTHORITY; PRIVATE DEVELOPER; NEW CITY; OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM; MINIMUM LEVEL; PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP; TRANSACTION COST; URBAN INVESTMENT; POLITICAL SYSTEMS; CROWDING OUT; METROPOLITAN AREA; COMPANY TOWN; MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA; PECUNIARY EXTERNALITY; PUBLIC SPACE; RURAL TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE; NEW CONCEPT; PUBLIC GOODS; CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE; FISCAL INSTRUMENT; OPPORTUNITY COST; AGGLOMERATION EFFECT; UPPER RIGHT; MARGINAL OUTPUT; BIG CITY; GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM; IRREVERSIBLE INVESTMENT; POTENTIAL COMPETITION; TAX COLLECTION; TAX BASE; PUBLIC SPHERE; DISEQUILIBRIUM MODEL; LAND USE; LAND PLOT; INCREASING FUNCTION; GAME THEORY; LAND RENT; ANALYTICAL MODELS; OPEN DOOR; POLITICAL ECONOMICS; DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY; DUOPOLY GAME; IN ECONOMICS; LIMITED CAPACITY; MACROECONOMIC THEORY; PARAMETER VALUE; CIVIC RIGHTS; DELIVERING SERVICES; RESEARCH BASE; LEGAL TRADITION; CLAWING BACK; CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK; MODERN ECONOMY; WINNING BID; SIMPLE MODEL; INVESTMENT COST; SOCIAL COST; OPTIMAL SIZE; SOCIAL ASPECT; URBAN LANDSCAPE; GLOBAL TREND; AGGREGATE INCOME; TRADITIONAL VILLAGE; SPATIAL INEQUALITY; RESTRICTIVE COVENANT; FISCAL COST; MINIMUM PRICE; NET TRANSFER; TAX INCENTIVE; POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP; TRANSFER RESOURCE; MANAGERIAL CAPACITY; OWNERSHIP RIGHT; SOCIAL VALUE; JOB OPPORTUNITY; SOCIAL AFFAIRS; OPEN ACCESS; NORMATIVE ANALYSIS; URBAN AFFAIR; CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT; PERFECT SUBSTITUTABILITY; CORNER SOLUTION; SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS; JOB OPPORTUNITIES; RESIDENT POPULATION; AGGLOMERATION BENEFIT; URBAN FUNCTION; CENTRAL CITY; WELFARE ECONOMICS; MARKET PRICE; PRIVILEGED ACCESS; LAND CONVERSION; LAND ASSEMBLY; DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION; CLEAR TITLE; LAND OWNERSHIP; RESEARCH SUPPORT; ALTERNATIVE INTERVENTION; STATE COUNCIL; LOCAL JURISDICTION; RESOURCE COST; CITY REGION; LAND ZONING; ENFORCEMENT AGENCY; EMPIRICAL WORK; STATE OWNERSHIP; LOCAL AUTONOMY; DEVELOPMENT POLICY; POLICE FORCE; SECURITY CRITERION; TOWNSHIP GOVERNMENT; LOCAL INFRASTRUCTURE; CULTURAL TRADITION; URBAN GOVERNANCE; AGRICULTURAL LAND; MARKET-ORIENTED ECONOMY; BENCHMARKING EXERCISE; LAND AREA; RESIDENTIAL AREA; LIVABILITY CITY; URBAN ENTITY; LOCAL SPECIFICITY; URBAN PLANNING; ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY; INSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES; URBAN POPULATION; URBAN DWELLER; PHNOM PENH; INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINT; FIRM PROFITABILITY; LIVABLE CITY; ADVANCED COUNTRY; EMPLOYMENT SUBSIDY; BUDGET RESOURCE; URBAN STUDY; CITIZEN ASSOCIATIONS; LAND-USE RESTRICTIONS; TAKE TIME; SPATIAL ECONOMICS
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/246311644526670690/Private-Cities-Implications-for-Urban-Policy-in-Developing-Countries
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/37016