The Impact of PTAs on the Duration of Antidumping Protection
This paper examines the impact of preferential trade agreements on the duration of antidumping protection. It employs a two-step selection model where the first step accounts for the impact of preferential trade agreement membership on the original...
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| Language: | English |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2021
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/608151619122450659/The-Impact-of-PTAs-on-the-Duration-of-Antidumping-Protection http://hdl.handle.net/10986/35515 |
| Summary: | This paper examines the impact of
preferential trade agreements on the duration of antidumping
protection. It employs a two-step selection model where the
first step accounts for the impact of preferential trade
agreement membership on the original antidumping
determination, and the second step estimates the impact of
preferential trade agreement membership on the duration of
duties. Several key findings emerge from the analysis. Most
importantly, the duration of antidumping protection is
significantly shorter for preferential trade agreement
members, compared with targeted countries that are not
preferential trade agreement members. The estimates imply
that preferential trade agreement membership is associated
with a 30 percent reduction in the duration of protection.
Second, the impact on duration depends, in part, on whether
the preferential trade agreement has rules specifically
related to antidumping. On average, over all users and
targeted countries, the impact on duration is about twice as
large for preferential trade agreements with rules, compared
with those with- out rules (and both have shorter duration
than non-preferential trade agreement members). Third, the
duration of antidumping measures has increased markedly over
time, primarily due to cases in the right tail of the
distribution. This is consistent with the widespread belief
that the Uruguay Round's sunset review provisions did
not produce the result that many World Trade Organization
members sought, but it also reflects the growing fraction of
cases targeting China. Although the rising fraction of cases
against China partly explains why duration has increased, it
does not explain the finding with respect to the impact of
preferential trade agreements and duration. |
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