Description: Politics and Preschool : The Political Economy of Investment in Pre-Primary Education

Politics and Preschool : The Political Economy of Investment in Pre-Primary Education

What drives governments with similar revenues to publicly provide very different amounts of goods for which private substitutes are available? Key examples are education and health care. This paper compares spending by Brazilian municipalities on p...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Kosec, Katrina
Language:	English
Published:	2012
Subjects:	ACCESS TO SERVICES AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS BASIC EDUCATION BASIC EDUCATION INVESTMENT BENEFITS OF INVESTMENT BRIBES CHILD CARE CITIES CLASS SIZE DATA ON STUDENTS DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS EARNINGS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC POLICY ECONOMIES OF SCALE EDUCATION EXPENDITURES EDUCATION FINANCE EDUCATION FUND EDUCATION FUNDS EDUCATION SECTOR EDUCATION STANDARDS EDUCATION SYSTEM ELECTRICITY ELEMENTARY EDUCATION EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES ENROLLMENT RATE ENROLLMENT RATES EQUAL ACCESS EQUALIZATION ETHNIC GROUPS EXCHANGE RATE EXCLUSION FELLOWSHIP FINANCES FISCAL FEDERALISM FORMAL SCHOOLING GENDER GRADE LEVELS HEAD START HIGHER ENROLLMENT HOUSEHOLD INCOME HOUSEHOLDS HUMAN CAPITAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INEQUALITY INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERVENTIONS INVESTMENT DECISIONS LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL TAXES MAYORS MEDIAN VOTER MODEL MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS MUNICIPALITIES MUNICIPALITY PER CAPITA INCOME POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL POWER POOR ACCESS PREPRIMARY EDUCATION PRESCHOOL CHILDREN PRESCHOOL EDUCATION PRESCHOOL ENROLLMENT PRIMARY EDUCATION PRIMARY EDUCATION QUALITY PRIMARY ENROLLMENT PRIMARY ENROLLMENT RATE PRIMARY SCHOOL PRIMARY SCHOOL AGE PRIMARY SCHOOL CHILD PRIMARY SCHOOL STUDENTS PRIMARY SCHOOLS PRIMARY STUDENTS PRIMARY TEACHER PRIMARY TEACHERS PRIVATE EDUCATION PRIVATE SCHOOL PRIVATE SCHOOLING PRIVATE SCHOOLS PRIVATE SECTOR PUBLIC PUBLIC EDUCATION PUBLIC EDUCATION SPENDING PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC FUNDS PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC PROVISION PUBLIC RESOURCES PUBLIC SCHOOL PUBLIC SCHOOLS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR COUNTERPARTS PUBLIC SPENDING PUBLIC TRANSIT PURCHASING POWER RECEIPTS REVENUE TRANSFERS ROADS RURAL AREAS SCHOOL ATTENDANCE SCHOOL BUILDING SCHOOL DISTRICTS SCHOOL FACILITY SCHOOL FINANCE SCHOOL QUALITY SCHOOL TUITION SCHOOLING QUALITY SOCIAL WELFARE STATE GOVERNMENT STATE GOVERNMENTS TAX TAX COLLECTION TAX REVENUE TEACHERS TRANSPARENCY TREASURY UNION UNIVERSAL PRIMARY EDUCATION URBAN AREAS URBAN DEVELOPMENT URBAN POOR URBANIZATION VILLAGE VILLAGES VOTERS
Online Access:	http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20110502113258 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3411

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Summary:	What drives governments with similar revenues to publicly provide very different amounts of goods for which private substitutes are available? Key examples are education and health care. This paper compares spending by Brazilian municipalities on pre-primary education -- a good that is also provided privately -- with spending on public infrastructure like parks and roads, which lacks private substitutes. Panel data from 1995-2008 reveal how the distribution of income affects public investment. Revenue is endogenous to investment outcomes, and the analysis addresses this problem by exploiting a 1998, nationwide education finance reform and several revisions to the policy. The author constructs a variable that captures exogenous variation in revenue generated by nonlinearities of the law to instrument for observed revenue. Municipalities with higher median income and more inequality are less likely to allocate revenue to education or to expand pre-primary enrollment. They are more likely to allocate revenue to public infrastructure. There is suggestive evidence that this occurs for two reasons, hypothesized in two separate literatures. In rich and unequal municipalities, fewer total people support public education spending (the collective choice channel), and also, any given poor person wanting public education has less influence over policymakers there (the political power channel).

Politics and Preschool : The Political Economy of Investment in Pre-Primary Education

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