Tajikistan Risk and Resilience Assessment
Tajikistan was ill-equipped for independence in 1991, and slipped almost immediately into violence. The civil war ended in 1997 with a peace accord that, thanks to a power sharing agreement, was able for a few years to ensure a degree of peaceful p...
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| Language: | English |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2019
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/191141570826500962/Tajikistan-Risk-and-resilience-assessment http://hdl.handle.net/10986/32548 |
| Summary: | Tajikistan was ill-equipped for
independence in 1991, and slipped almost immediately into
violence. The civil war ended in 1997 with a peace accord
that, thanks to a power sharing agreement, was able for a
few years to ensure a degree of peaceful political
competition. In recent years, political instability and the
potential for violence in Tajikistan has grown with
pervasive governance challenges, include elite capture of
political and economic power, high-level corruption, and the
closing of political space. Political and security
challenges exacerbate, and are exacerbated by, economic,
social, and cross-border risks. Indeed, most global indices
that examine fragility and conflict place Tajikistan in a
category of elevated risk. This risk and resilience
assessment (RRA) is intended to provide a comprehensive
understanding of the fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV)
stresses facing Tajikistan and the potential role of the
Bank in helping to address these risks. Report is organized
as follows: chapter one gives introduction. Chapter two of
the provides an overview of Tajikistan’s geography,
demography, and economy and discusses the historical context
that has led to Tajikistan’s current challenges. Chapter
three provides an overview of the priority risks - political
and security, economic, inclusion and regionalism, and
cross-border and global that increase Tajikistan’s
vulnerability to violence and instability. Chapter four
discusses the specific triggers or scenarios that can
destabilize the status quo or lead to widespread unrest.
Chapter five identifies sources of resilience the World Bank
Group (WBG) may wish to consider and build upon. Chapter six
concludes with suggested recommendations to the WB on the
way forward. |
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