Reporting by Audit Oversight Bodies
A wave of accounting scandals beginning about fifteen years ago, including Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat, created a consensus among policymakers across the globe that independent auditors were not adequately challenging the financial reporting by t...
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| Language: | English |
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World Bank, Vienna
2019
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/376231555919675464/Reporting-by-Audit-Oversight-Bodies http://hdl.handle.net/10986/31615 |
| Summary: | A wave of accounting scandals beginning
about fifteen years ago, including Enron, WorldCom, and
Parmalat, created a consensus among policymakers across the
globe that independent auditors were not adequately
challenging the financial reporting by their clients and
could not be trusted to regulate themselves. Beginning with
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the U.S., there has been a
global movement away from self-regulation of the auditing
profession and towards independent oversight. Perhaps the
most important milestone in this movement was the 2006 Audit
Directive of the European Union, which required all EU
members and accession candidates to implement independent
oversight. A key goal of independent oversight is to provide
relevant and reliable information to investors, lenders,
audit committees, regulators, other stakeholders, and the
general public about auditors and the audit market, among
other matters. This paper aims to provide a brief synopsis
on the topic of reporting by audit oversight bodies (AOBs)
through their annual and inspection reports. It outlines
international principles and legislative requirements,
highlights certain good practices and shares results from a
focused survey across EU-REPARIS and STAREP countries. |
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