Holdings: Explaining Inefficient Policy Instruments

Explaining Inefficient Policy Instruments

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the literature on the political economy of policy instrument choice and relate it to the experiences in agriculture. The paper is therefore organized as follows. The second section provides a r...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	de Gorter, Harry
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2017
Subjects:	ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE AGENCY PROBLEMS AGRICULTURE ALLOCATION ASSET VALUES ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AVERAGE COSTS BANKS BARGAINING BARGAINING POWER BOND BUDGET DEFICIT BUREAUCRACY CASH PAYMENTS COLLECTIVE ACTION COMMODITIES COMMODITY COMMODITY PRICE COMMODITY PRICES COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS CONSUMERS CORRUPTION DEMOCRACIES DEPRESSION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DIRECT PAYMENTS DISCOUNT RATE DISCRETION DIVIDEND DOMESTIC PRICE DUMPING DYNAMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC CRISIS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC FORCES ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC HISTORY ECONOMIC MODELS ECONOMIC REFORMS ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS ECONOMICS LITERATURE EFFICIENT OUTCOMES ENFORCEMENT OF CONTRACTS EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS EXCHANGE RATE EXPORTS FOOD PRICE FOOD PRICES FREE MARKETS FREE TRADE GAME THEORY GDP GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM GOVERNMENT ACTIONS GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION HARMONIZATION IMPERFECT INFORMATION IMPORT BARRIERS IMPORT QUOTAS INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME EFFECT INCOME TAX INCOME TAXES INCOMES INCREASING RETURNS INCUMBENT INEFFICIENCY INELASTIC DEMAND INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES INITIATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS INSURANCE INTEREST GROUP INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL TRADE LABOR MARKETS LABOR SUPPLY LEADERSHIP LEGITIMACY LOBBYING LUMP SUM TRANSFERS MARKET CONDITIONS MARKET DISTORTIONS MARKET FAILURE MARKET FAILURES MARKET PRICE MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS MONOPOLY MOTIVATION PATRONAGE PENALTIES POLICES POLITICAL DEMOCRACY POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL PARTY POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL PROCESS POLITICAL REGIME POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICAL SYSTEM POLITICIAN POLITICIANS POLLUTION PREFERENCE FUNCTIONS PRICE DISCRIMINATION PRICE DISTORTION PRICE DISTORTIONS PRICE POLICIES PRIVATE SECTOR PRODUCTION COSTS PRODUCTIVITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC POLICIES REAL WAGES REMEDY RENT SEEKING REPUTATION SAFETY SAFETY NETS SAVINGS SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES SMALL COUNTRIES SOCIAL BENEFITS SOCIAL COSTS STRUCTURAL CHANGE SUPPLY CURVE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TAX TAX REVENUES TAXATION TOTAL OUTPUT TRADE BARRIERS TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE NEGOTIATIONS TRADE POLICIES TRADE POLICY TRADE-OFF TRADES TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSACTIONS COSTS TRANSPARENCY URUGUAY ROUND VOTERS WAGE TAXES WAGES WEALTH WELFARE ECONOMICS WTO
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/585151468329339087/Explaining-inefficient-policy-instruments http://hdl.handle.net/10986/28275

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/585151468329339087/Explaining-inefficient-policy-instruments
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/28275

Explaining Inefficient Policy Instruments

Internet

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