Constitutional Rules and Agricultural Policy Outcomes
This paper deals with the effect of constitutional rules on agricultural policy outcomes in a panel of observations for more than 70 developing and developed countries in the 1955-2005 period. Testable hypotheses are drawn from recent developments...
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| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2017
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/148201468168839812/Constitutional-rules-and-agricultural-policy-outcomes http://hdl.handle.net/10986/28158 |
| Summary: | This paper deals with the effect of
constitutional rules on agricultural policy outcomes in a
panel of observations for more than 70 developing and
developed countries in the 1955-2005 period. Testable
hypotheses are drawn from recent developments in the
comparative politics literature that see political
institutions as key elements in shaping public policies.
Using differences-in-differences regressions we find a
positive effect of a transition into democracy on
agricultural protection. However, this average effect masks
substantial heterogeneities across different forms of
democracy. Indeed, what matters are transitions to
proportional democracies, as well as to permanent
democracies. Moreover, while the author does not detect
significant differences across alternative forms of
government (presidential versus parliamentary systems),
there is some evidence that the effect of proportional
election is exacerbated under parliamentary regimes, and
diminished under presidential ones. |
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