Description: Assessment of Net Mitigation in the Context of International Greenhouse Gas Emissions Control Mechanisms

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Assessment of Net Mitigation in the Context of International Greenhouse Gas Emissions Control Mechanisms

This paper discusses the scope for market mechanisms, already established for greenhouse gas mitigation in Annex 1 countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol, for implementing "net mitigation," defined here as mitigation beyond Annex 1 co...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Strand, Jon
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2016
Subjects:	EMISSION ALLOWANCES ALLOWANCE EMISSIONS REDUCTION ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS POWER PLANTS ELECTRICITY SECTOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION TEMPERATURE FOSSIL FUELS EMISSIONS GROWTH PUBLIC ECONOMICS EMISSIONS INTENSITY OFFSET PRICE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS EMISSIONS LEVELS EMISSIONS QUOTAS INCOME CARBON MARGINAL COST VARIABLE COST DISCOUNT RATE EMISSIONS OFFSET PRICES OFFSET PROJECTS GLOBAL CARBON MARKET INCENTIVES EMISSION REDUCTION GHGS ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION ENERGY SUBSIDIES MODELS GAS GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION REDUCTION UNITS EMISSIONS CONTROL PRICE ECONOMIC ACTOR EMISSION REDUCTIONS AIR GREENHOUSE GAS CARBON LEAKAGE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS EMISSIONS ABATEMENT POLICY RESPONSE EMISSIONS CONSTRAINTS CO2 GREENHOUSE GAS MITIGATION ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS CLIMATE POLICIES FEASIBILITY EMISSION LEVELS GHG POLICY APPROACH GLOBAL EMISSIONS REDUCTION CLIMATE‐POLICY FREE ALLOCATION CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE MARKETS CARBON TAXES EMISSIONS LEAKAGE EMISSIONS PRICES EMISSIONS MITIGATION EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS CLIMATE CHANGE GAS EMISSIONS FOSSIL‐FUEL CAPS ENERGY POLICY FUELS CARBON FINANCE GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROL FINANCE GREENHOUSE GASES CAP‐AND‐TRADE POLICY ET CARBON EMISSIONS NATIONAL EMISSIONS FREE‐ALLOCATION EMISSIONS BASELINE GREENHOUSE EMISSION CONSUMPTION CLIMATE CHANGE ECONOMICS LEAD POLICIES CLIMATE‐ POLICY ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR CARBON CREDITS POLICY MAKERS CARBON TAX RESOURCE ECONOMICS ELECTRICITY EMISSIONS POLICY DISCOUNT RATES EMISSIONS CAPS CLIMATE DEMAND FORESTS ABATEMENT LOWER PRICE GLOBAL EMISSION HFC‐23 FOSSIL FUEL HISTORICAL EMISSIONS OFFSETS DISCOUNTING CATALYSTS DOMESTIC EMISSIONS GLOBAL EMISSIONS EMISSIONS ALLOCATIONS MARKET BASELINE” EMISSIONS ECONOMIC THEORY POLICY CERTIFIED EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS ENERGY PRODUCTION ALLOWANCES ENERGY EFFICIENCY PURCHASES OF OFFSETS EMISSIONS‐MITIGATION EMISSIONS TAXES EMISSIONS TARGETS LOWER PRICES COAL ALLOCATION ENERGY ECONOMICS SUPPLY CARBON MARKET INTERNATIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INVESTMENTS PRICE OF OFFSETS CLIMATE POLICY OFFSETS ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS RENEWABLE ENERGY INTERNATIONAL OFFSETS GASES FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE PRICES NEGATIVE IMPACTS BENEFITS ENERGY
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/03/26050718/assessment-net-mitigation-context-international-greenhouse-gas-emissions-control-mechanisms http://hdl.handle.net/10986/24137

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Summary:	This paper discusses the scope for market mechanisms, already established for greenhouse gas mitigation in Annex 1 countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol, for implementing "net mitigation," defined here as mitigation beyond Annex 1 countries' formal mitigation requirements under the Kyoto Protocol. Such market mechanisms could be useful for establishing and extending greenhouse gas mitigation targets also under the Paris Agreement from December 2015. Net mitigation is considered in two possible forms: as a "net atmospheric benefit," or as an “own contribution” by offset host countries. A main conclusion is that a “net atmospheric benefit” is possible at least in the short run, best implemented via stricter baselines against which offsets are credited; but it can also take the form of offset discounting whereby offset buyers are credited fewer credits. The latter, although generally inefficient, can be a second-best response to certain imperfections in the offset market, which are discussed in the paper. There is less merit for claiming that "own contributions" can lead to additional mitigation under existing mechanisms.