Description: Electoral Rules and Political Selection : Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan

Electoral Rules and Political Selection : Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan

Voters commonly face a choice between competent candidates and those with policy preferences similar to their own. This paper explores how electoral rules, such as district magnitude, mediate this trade-off and affect the composition of representat...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Beath, Andrew, Christia, Fotini, Egorov, Georgy, Enikolopov, Ruben
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2015
Subjects:	POLICY ISSUE COMMUNITIES FOCUS GROUP NATIONAL PARLIAMENT VILLAGES DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS POLITICS CONSULTATION BRIBES VILLAGE BY ELECTION GOVERNMENT LEGISLATOR POLITICAL CAREERS LOCAL GOVERNMENTS POLITICAL THEORY DATA COLLECTION DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE GAMES INFORMATION SERVICES PARTY COMPETITION REPRESENTATIVE BODIES INCENTIVES ECONOMIC POLICY LOCAL ELECTIONS PROJECTS PROJECT PARLIAMENT ELECTORAL SYSTEM POLICY POSITION CITIES CORRUPTION OVERSIGHT ELECTORAL SYSTEMS CREDIBILITY DETAILED INFORMATION PUBLIC POLICY COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT TRAINING EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT INTERVENTION RENT CIVIL SOCIETY VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT ELECTED REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY POLITICAL POWER CANDIDATES RESIDENCES INHABITANTS DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS FIGURES ACCESS REPRESENTATIVES PARLIAMENTS GRANTS PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY POLITICAL SYSTEM DESIGN GRANT ELECTIONS CONSTITUENTS INTERVIEWS ACCOUNTABILITY POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS FAIRS DESCRIPTION PARTICIPATION MOBILE PHONE SURVEY GENDER HOMES CASTING VOTES POLICY STUDIES REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS WORKSHOP OCCUPATION HOUSEHOLD CONSTITUENCY DECISION MAKING LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES OPENNESS GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT HOUSE OF COMMONS ELIGIBLE VOTERS SOCIAL WELFARE POLITICAL PARTIES DEMOCRACIES POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION CONSENSUS VILLAGE LEVEL HOUSEHOLDS PARTNERS ELECTORATE LOCAL PARTICIPATION DWELLINGS FACILITIES LOCAL LEADERS HOUSES INTERVENTIONS LEGISLATORS REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS PUBLIC SERVICE GOVERNMENTS INTERMEDIARIES POLLING STATION ELECTION PUBLIC GOOD FEMALE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES DIRECT DEMOCRACY SERVICE DISTRICTS DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES RECONSTRUCTION PUBLIC GOODS
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/07/24775055/electoral-rules-political-selection-theory-evidence-field-experiment-afghanistan http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22446

Description
Summary:	Voters commonly face a choice between competent candidates and those with policy preferences similar to their own. This paper explores how electoral rules, such as district magnitude, mediate this trade-off and affect the composition of representative bodies and policy outcomes. The paper shows formally that anticipation of bargaining over policy causes voters in elections with multiple single-member districts to prefer candidates with polarized policy positions over more competent candidates. Results from a unique field experiment in Afghanistan are consistent with these predictions. Specifically, representatives elected in elections with a single multi-member district are better educated and exhibit less extreme policy preferences.

Electoral Rules and Political Selection : Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan

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