Do Public Health Interventions Crowd Out Private Health Investments? : Malaria Control Policies in Eritrea
It is often argued that engaging in indoor residual spraying in areas with high coverage of mosquito bed nets may discourage net ownership and use. This is just a case of a public program having perverse incentives. This paper analyzes new data fro...
| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2015
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/05/24491029/public-health-interventions-crowd-out-private-health-investments-malaria-control-policies-eritrea http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21997 |
| Summary: | It is often argued that engaging in
indoor residual spraying in areas with high coverage of
mosquito bed nets may discourage net ownership and use. This
is just a case of a public program having perverse
incentives. This paper analyzes new data from a randomized
control trial conducted in Eritrea, which surprisingly shows
the opposite: indoor residual spraying encouraged net
acquisition and use. The evidence points to the role of
imperfect information. The introduction of indoor residual
spraying may have made the problem of malaria more salient,
leading to a change in beliefs about its importance and to
an increase in private health investments. |
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