Sponsoring a Race to the Top : The Case for Results-Based Intergovernmental Finance for Merit Goods
Intergovernmental finance is a significant source of sub-national finance in most countries. In both industrial and developing countries, formula based "manna from heaven" general purpose transfers dominate but co-exist with highly intrus...
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Language: | English en_US |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2010/01/11633540/sponsoring-race-top-case-results-based-intergovernmental-finance-merit-goods http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19948 |
Summary: | Intergovernmental finance is a
significant source of sub-national finance in most
countries. In both industrial and developing countries,
formula based "manna from heaven" general purpose
transfers dominate but co-exist with highly intrusive
micro-managed "command and control" specific
purpose transfers. Both these types of transfers undermine
political and fiscal accountability. Reforms to bring in
design elements that incorporate incentives for
results-based accountability are resisted by both donors and
recipients alike. This is because the donors perceive such
reforms as attempts at chipping away at their powers and
recipients fear such programs will be intrusive. This paper
presents conceptual and practical underpinnings of grant
designs that could further simplicity, objectivity, and
local autonomy objectives while furthering citizen-centric
results-based accountability. The paper further highlights a
few notable recent initiatives in both industrial and
developing countries that embrace such directions for
reform. The paper concludes that results-based
intergovernmental finance offers significant potential to
minimize tradeoffs between local autonomy and accountability
while furthering access to merit goods. |
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