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Perverse Effects of a Ratings-Related Capital Adequacy System

It has recently been proposed that banks be allowed to hold less capital against loans to borrowers who have received a favorable rating by an approved rating agency. But a plausible model of rating-agency behavior shows that this strategy could ha...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Honohan, Patrick
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:
BANK CAPITAL
BANK FAILURE
BANK FAILURES
BANK LENDING
BANK SAFETY
BANKING CRISES
BANKING SUPERVISION
BANKING SYSTEM
BANKS
BONDS
BORROWING
BORROWING COSTS
CAPITAL ADEQUACY
CAPITAL MARKETS
CAPITAL REQUIREMENT
CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS
CARBON
CARBON DIOXIDE
CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS
CENTRAL BANKS
DEBT
DEFAULT RISK
DEPOSIT INSURANCE
DEPOSITORS
DEPOSITS
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
EMISSIONS
EMISSIONS TAXES
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
EQUILIBRIUM
FINANCIAL MARKETS
FORESTRY
FREE ENTRY
INFORMATION COSTS
INSURERS
JOINT IMPLEMENTATION
LIBERALIZATION
MARKET POWER
OIL
PRIVATIZATION
RATES
RATING AGENCIES
RISK EVALUATION
RISK FACTORS
RISK OF DEFAULT
SECURITIES
SYSTEMIC RISK
WATER SUPPLY
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/06/437401/perverse-effects-ratings-related-capital-adequacy-system
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19828

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/06/437401/perverse-effects-ratings-related-capital-adequacy-system
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19828

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