The Role of Special Differential Treatment for Developing Countries in GATT and the World Trade Organization
The author analyzes how changes in thinking about the role trade plays in economic development have been reflected in provisions affecting developing countries in the GATT and the WTO. He focuses on the provisions calling for the special and differ...
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Language: | English en_US |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/07/443620/role-special-differential-treatment-developing-countries-gatt-world-trade-organization http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19819 |
Summary: | The author analyzes how changes in
thinking about the role trade plays in economic development
have been reflected in provisions affecting developing
countries in the GATT and the WTO. He focuses on the
provisions calling for the special and differential
treatment of developing countries. The WTO's special,
and differential treatment has been extended to include
measures of technical assistance, and extended transition
periods to enable countries to meet their commitments in new
areas agreed on in the Uruguay round of negotiations. At the
same time, many WTO provisions encourage industrial
countries to give developing countries preferential
treatment, through a variety of measures, none of them
legally enforceable. The author concludes that weaknesses in
the institutional capacity of many developing countries,
provide a conceptual basis for continuing special, and
differential treatment in the WTO, but that the benefits
should be targeted only to low-income developing countries,
and those that need help becoming integrated with the
international trading system. In addition, an effective
system of graduation, should be put in place for
higher-income developing countries. Developing countries
find it politically easier to argue, that all should be
treated the same, except for least developed countries,
although their capacities, and need for assistance differ
vastly. Industrial countries are expected to provide
special, and differential treatment, but in practice, their
commitments on market access, preferential treatment, and
technical assistance, are not enforceable. Leaving it up to
the industrial countries to decide which developing
countries get preferential treatment, invites extraneous
considerations in determining who gets how much special
treatment. Unless higher-income developing countries accept
some type of graduated differentiation in their treatment
(beyond that granted the least developed countries), there
is little prospect of implementing meaningful, legally
enforceable special, and differential treatment favoring all
developing countries under the WTO. |
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