Corruption, Composition of Capital Flows, and Currency Crises
Crony capitalism and international creditors' self-fulfilling expectations are often suggested as rival explanations for currency crises. A possible link between the two has not been explored. The author shows one channel through which crony c...
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Language: | English en_US |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/08/693237/corruption-composition-capital-flows-currency-crises http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19816 |
Summary: | Crony capitalism and international
creditors' self-fulfilling expectations are often
suggested as rival explanations for currency crises. A
possible link between the two has not been explored. The
author shows one channel through which crony capitalism can
increase the chance of a currency/financial crisis by
altering the composition of capital inflows. Using data on
bilateral foreign direct investment and bilateral bank
loans, the author finds clear evidence that in corrupt
countries the composition of capital inflows is relatively
light in foreign direct investment. Earlier studies
indicated that a country with a capital inflow structure is
more likely to run into a currency crisis down the road
(partly through international creditors'
self-fulfilling expectations). Therefore, crony capitalism,
through its effect on the composition of a country's
capital inflows, makes the country more vulnerable to
currency crises brought about by self-fulfilling
expectations. Corruption may also weaken domestic financial
supervision, with a subsequent deterioration in the quality
in banks' and firms' balance sheets. |
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