Cover Image

Investigating Corruption

Agency theory has had little to say about the control of bureaucratic corruption, perhaps the greatest agency problem that exists. The author considers the role of incentive contracting in reducing corruption through the use of independent investig...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Prendergast, Canice
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:
AGENCY PROBLEMS
BENCHMARK
BRIBERY
BRIBES
COLLUSION
COMPLAINTS
CONSUMERS
CORRUPT PRACTICES
CORRUPTION
CORRUPTION CHARGES
DECENTRALIZATION
DISCRETION
ECONOMICS
GNP
INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATORS
INVESTIGATIONS
LIQUIDITY
MALFEASANCE
MORAL HAZARD
PENALTIES
POLICY RESEARCH
PUBLIC SERVICES
RISK AVERSE
RISK NEUTRAL
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/12/748707/investigating-corruption
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19730

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/12/748707/investigating-corruption
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19730

Similar Items