International Cartel Enforcement : Lessons from the 1990s
The enforcement record of the 1990s shows that private international cartels are not defunct--nor do they always fall quickly under the weight of their own incentive problems. Of a sample of 40 such cartels prosecuted by the United States and the E...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/09/1614730/international-cartel-enforcement-lessons-1990s http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19538 |
| Summary: | The enforcement record of the 1990s
shows that private international cartels are not
defunct--nor do they always fall quickly under the weight of
their own incentive problems. Of a sample of 40 such cartels
prosecuted by the United States and the European Union in
the 1990s, 24 lasted at least four years. And for the 20
cartels in this sample where sales data are available, the
annual worldwide turnover in affected products exceeded $30
billion. National competition policies address harm in
domestic markets, and in some cases prohibit cartels without
taking strong enforcement measures. The authors propose a
series of reforms to national policies and steps to enhance
international cooperation that will strengthen the
deterrents against international cartelization. Furthermore,
the authors argue that aggressive prosecution of cartels
must be complemented by vigilance in other areas of
competition policy. If not, firms will respond to the
enhanced deterrents to cartelization by merging or by taking
other measures that lessen competitive pressures. |
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