Hospital Governance and Incentive Design : The Case of Corporatized Public Hospitals in Lebanon
There are three potential levels of government activity in the health sector: regulation, finance, and direct provision of services, with the government owning and managing hospitals and primary care clinics. Eid focuses on service provision. In re...
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| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/11/1643372/hospital-governance-incentive-design-case-corporatized-public-hospitals-lebanon http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19424 |
| Summary: | There are three potential levels of
government activity in the health sector: regulation,
finance, and direct provision of services, with the
government owning and managing hospitals and primary care
clinics. Eid focuses on service provision. In recent years
corporatization has been introduced as an institutional
design for public hospitals-as a means of improving
efficiency and reducing transfers in a publicly owned,
decentralized health system. Eid treats decentralization as
a reallocation of decision rights to lower levels of the
public sector. She shows how such a strategy creates new
needs for monitoring and control of decentralized units. To
improve the understanding of the role of governance and
incentives in corporatized hospitals, Eid explores the
design of corporate boards of public hospitals, the
institutional linchpin of such systems. She shows how
principal-agent theory, particularly the multitasking and
common agency approaches, can provide a useful analytical
lens in understanding hospital board design in the case of
Lebanon. She also shows the implications of corporatization
for health policy and management. |
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