The Determinants of Government Environmental Performance : An Empirical Analysis of Chinese Townships
This paper explores the determinants of government environmental performance at the local level. Chinese township governments, the lowest level in the hierarchical government structure, were selected for this exercise. The performance indicators us...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/12/2109778/determinants-government-environmental-performance-empirical-analysis-chinese-townships http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19197 |
| Summary: | This paper explores the determinants of
government environmental performance at the local level.
Chinese township governments, the lowest level in the
hierarchical government structure, were selected for this
exercise. The performance indicators used in the analyses
include the efforts of enforcing government environmental
regulations and of providing environmental services to
polluting enterprises. The performance determinants
identified include environmental performance of upper-level
governments, local development status, industrial
employment, income of workers in polluting enterprises,
local environmental quality, and public pressure for
environmental quality improvement. A survey of 85 townships
and interviews of 151 township government leaders were
conducted in three provinces of China. The statistical
results show that: a) The environmental performance of
upper-level governments in China strongly and positively
influences the environmental efforts of the township
governments. b) Public pressure has created incentives for
the township governments to improve their efforts in both
enforcing environmental regulations and providing
environmental services, while the environmental quality did
not show significant impacts. c) Higher employment in
industries tends to have a negative influence on the
regulatory enforcement, but a positive influence on
environmental service provision. d) A higher enforcement
effort and a lower service provision are associated with
higher wages the workers received from industries. This
implies that the industries offering higher wages to the
workers are subject to more stringent environmental
enforcement but receive less environmental services. 5)
Richer townships tend to have less regulatory enforcement
but better environmental services. |
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