U.S. Contingent Protection against Honey Imports : Development Aspects and the Doha Round
On December 10, 2001 the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) imposed steep antidumping duties against honey imports from Argentina and China ranging from 32.6 percent to 183.8 percent, and a countervailing duty against Argentina of 5.9 percent. A pre...
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| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/06/2438512/contingent-protection-against-honey-imports-development-aspects-doha-round http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18178 |
| Summary: | On December 10, 2001 the U.S. Department
of Commerce (DOC) imposed steep antidumping duties against
honey imports from Argentina and China ranging from 32.6
percent to 183.8 percent, and a countervailing duty against
Argentina of 5.9 percent. A previous antidumping
investigation in 1995 ended with a suspension
"agreement" that curtailed U.S. imports from China
by around 30 percent. Millions of beekeepers around the
world, most of them poor, make a living from honey
production, and a free and competitive world market would
help raise their standards of living. Nevertheless, the
sequential pattern of increasing and widening protectionism
followed by the United States, the world's top
importer, to include successful exporters under the effects
of its contingent protection measures sends a clear message
that other countries should think twice before investing in
expanding honey exports to the United States. In addition to
looking into the trade effects of these contingent
protection measures, the author concludes that under the
regulatory arrangements of the DOC, Argentina's
beekeepers never had a chance of defending themselves. For
example, responding to the DOC's lengthy and
sophisticated questionnaires that sought to determine cost
of production went beyond the capacities of poor beekeepers.
In the absence of information, the DOC resorted to evidence
presented by the petitioners which was riddled with errors.
The available evidence suggests that had beekeepers been
capable of responding to the questionnaires, the margin of
dumping would had been lower, if at all existent. This and
other evidence discussed by the author suggest the urgent
need to introduce reforms into the World Trade Organization
antidumping and subsidy agreements. At the minimum what is
required is a consensus that all respondents be given the
same opportunity by the international trade rules. The
author argues that at present this is not the case and
offers suggestions for reforms. |
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