Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption : Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help?
The authors provide a new approach to the evaluation of pre-shipment inspection (PSI) programs as ways of improving tariff-revenue collection and reducing fraud when customs administrations are corrupt. They build a model highlighting the contribut...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/10/2693635/tariff-evasion-customs-corruption-pre-shipment-inspection-help http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18046 |
| Summary: | The authors provide a new approach to
the evaluation of pre-shipment inspection (PSI) programs as
ways of improving tariff-revenue collection and reducing
fraud when customs administrations are corrupt. They build a
model highlighting the contribution of surveillance firms to
the generation of information and describing how incentives
for fraud and collusive behavior between importers and
customs are affected by the introduction of PSI. The authors
show theoretically that the introduction of PSI has an
ambiguous effect on the level of customs fraud. Empirically,
the econometric results suggest that PSI reduced fraud in
the Philippines, it increased it in Argentina, and did not
have significant impact in Indonesia. |
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