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Customs, Brokers, and Informal Sectors : A Cameroon Case Study

Based on extensive interviews with informal importers and brokers in Cameroon, this paper explains why customs reform aimed at reducing fraud and corruption may be difficult to achieve. Informal traders and brokers (without licenses) follow various...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Cantens, Thomas, Kaminski, Jonathan, Raballand, Gaël, Tchapa, Tchouawou
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:
ACCOUNTING
AMOUNT OF DUTIES
AREA OF CUSTOMS
BANK ACCOUNT
BARRIER TO ENTRY
BARRIERS TO ENTRY
BOTTLENECKS
BROKER
BROKERAGE
BROKERS
BUSES
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
BUSINESS FORMATION
BUSINESS MODEL
BUSINESS MODELS
BUSINESS RELATIONS
BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS
BUSINESS SERVICES
BUSINESSES
CAR
CARS
CHECKS
COLLATERAL
COMMERCE
COMMODITY
COMPUTER HARDWARE
COMPUTERS
CREDIT ASSOCIATIONS
CREDIT MARKET
CUSTOMER BASE
CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIPS
CUSTOMS
CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION
CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATIONS
CUSTOMS AGENT
CUSTOMS AREA
CUSTOMS BROKERS
CUSTOMS CLEARANCE
CUSTOMS CONTROL
CUSTOMS DUTIES
CUSTOMS INFORMATION
CUSTOMS OFFICE
CUSTOMS OFFICERS
CUSTOMS OFFICES
CUSTOMS OFFICIALS
CUSTOMS PROCESS
CUSTOMS REFORM
CUSTOMS REGULATIONS
CUSTOMS REVENUES
DAY-TO-DAY MANAGEMENT
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
DEVELOPMENT BANK
DIRECT SALES
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
ELECTRONIC DEVICES
END CUSTOMERS
ENTRY POINT
FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
FINANCIAL RESOURCES
FOREIGN TRADE
FRAUD
FREIGHT
ID
IMAGE
INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY
INFORMATION FLOWS
INFORMATION SHARING
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
INTEREST RATE
INTERNATIONAL BANK
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LEVEL OF RISK
LIABILITY
LICENSE
LICENSES
LITIGATION
MANUFACTURING
MARKET DEMAND
MARKET FAILURES
MARKET SEGMENT
MARKET STRUCTURE
MARKETING
MARKETING STRATEGIES
MATERIAL
MEDIUM ENTERPRISES
MIDDLEMEN
MORAL HAZARD
NECESSARY SKILLS
NEIGHBORHOODS
NETWORKS
OPEN ACCESS
OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY
PERFORMANCES
PERSONAL INCOME
PETROLEUM PRODUCTS
POLICE
POLITICAL ECONOMY
PORT AUTHORITY
PRODUCT CATEGORY
PRODUCTIVITY
PROFIT MARGINS
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
REBATES
REGIONAL NETWORKS
RELIABILITY
RESULT
RESULTS
RETURN
RISK EXPOSURE
RISK PROFILE
ROUTE
SAVINGS
SAVINGS RATE
SERVICE PROVIDER
SMALL BUSINESS
SOCIAL CAPITAL
SPOT MARKET
SPOT MARKET TRANSACTIONS
STANDARDIZATION
STOCKS
SUPPLY CHAIN
TAX
TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS
TAX RATES
TAXATION
TELEPHONE
TIRES
TRACEABILITY
TRADE FACILITATION
TRADING
TRANSACTION
TRANSIT
TRANSIT SERVICE
TRANSIT SERVICE PROVIDER
TRANSIT SERVICES
TRANSPORT
TRANSPORT POLICY
TRUE
VALUE CHAIN
VEHICLE
VEHICLES
WAGES
WAREHOUSE
WAREHOUSES
WEB
WORKING CAPITAL
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/02/19148129/customs-brokers-informal-sectors-cameroon-case-study
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17335
Description
Summary:Based on extensive interviews with informal importers and brokers in Cameroon, this paper explains why customs reform aimed at reducing fraud and corruption may be difficult to achieve. Informal traders and brokers (without licenses) follow various business models and practices, which are product-specific. Overall, what matters first are customs brokers' practices. Information asymmetries mark transactions between brokers and importers and are accompanied by misperceptions of the costs and risks of informal brokers working among informal importers. In a low-governance environment with widespread informal practices, blanket policies should be avoided in order to discourage activities of unprofessional and systematic bribe-taker brokers. It is also essential that customs officials disrupt information asymmetries and better disseminate information to informal importers on customs processes and official costs. Finally, customs should more strongly sanction some informal brokers in order to reduce collusion with some customs officers.

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