Description: The Politics of Russian Enterprise Reform : Insiders, Local Governments, and the Obstacles to Restructuring

The Politics of Russian Enterprise Reform : Insiders, Local Governments, and the Obstacles to Restructuring

Russia and other countries in the commonwealth of independent states that have implemented voucher privatization programs have to account for the puzzling behavior of insiders manager-owners-who, in stripping assets from the firms they own, appear...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Desai, Raj M., Goldberg, Itzhak
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:	ACCOUNTING ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLES ACCUMULATION OF ARREARS ADJUDICATION ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS ARBITRAGE ARREARS ASSET STRIPPING ASSETS AUCTION AUCTIONS BAILIFF BAILIFFS BALANCE SHEETS BANK ACCOUNTS BANK CREDIT BANK LOANS BANKRUPT BANKRUPT FIRM BANKRUPTCIES BANKRUPTCY BANKRUPTCY PETITION BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURES BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS BANKRUPTCY RULES BENEFICIARIES BENEFICIARY BEQUEST BID BIDS BROKERAGE BROKERAGES BROKERS BUDGET CONSTRAINTS BUDGETING CAPITAL GAINS CAPITAL MARKETS CASH FLOW CASH FLOWS CASH PAYMENTS CASH TRANSACTIONS CHECKS CIVIL CODES CLAIM CLAIMANTS CLAIMS AGAINST PROPERTY CLASS ACTION COLLATERAL COMPANY LAW COMPETITIVE AUCTIONS CONCENTRATION OF OWNERSHIP CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE LAWS CORPORATE OWNERSHIP CORRUPTION COURT COSTS COURT PROCEEDINGS CREDIBILITY CREDITOR CREDITOR COORDINATION CREDITORS CREDITS DEBT COLLECTION DEBT CONCILIATION DEBT CRISIS DEBTOR DEBTOR COMPANIES DEBTORS DEBTS DECENTRALIZATION DEPENDENT DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS DIVIDENDS ECONOMIC REFORM ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS ENTERPRISE ARREARS ENTERPRISE DEBTS ENTERPRISE OPERATIONS ENTERPRISE REFORM ENTERPRISE RESTRUCTURING EQUITABLE TREATMENT EQUITY CONVERSION EQUITY SHARES ESTATE EXISTING LAWS EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURES EXPROPRIATION EXTERNAL INVESTORS FEDERAL BUDGETS FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT FINANCIERS FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FORBEARANCE FOREIGN COMPANIES FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOREIGN INVESTORS FORFEITURE FRAUD FREE MARKETS GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE GOVERNANCE SYSTEM GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT HARD BUDGET HOLDING HOLDING COMPANIES HOLDING COMPANY HOLDINGS ILLIQUIDITY IMPLICIT SUBSIDY INCOME STREAMS INCUMBENT MANAGERS INCUMBENT OWNERS INFLATION INSIDER TRADING INSOLVENCY INSOLVENT INSOLVENT COMPANIES INSOLVENT FIRM INSOLVENT FIRMS INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS INSTRUMENT INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION INTERNATIONAL MARKETS INVESTMENT CLIMATE INVESTMENT CONTRACTS INVESTMENT DECISIONS INVESTMENT FUNDS INVESTMENT VEHICLES INVESTOR PROTECTION IPO JOINT STOCK COMPANIES JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES JUDICIAL DECISIONS JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE JUDICIAL REVIEW JUDICIAL SYSTEM JUDICIARY LABOR MARKETS LAND PRIVATIZATION LEGAL ENVIRONMENT LEGAL RECOURSES LEGAL SYSTEM LENDERS LEVERAGE LEVIES LIQUIDATION LOAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL INVESTORS LOSS-MAKING LOSS-MAKING ENTERPRISES MAJOR CREDITORS MARKET ECONOMIES MARKET MECHANISMS MARKET PARTICIPANTS MERGERS MULTILATERAL LENDER NONPAYMENT NONVIABLE ENTERPRISES NOTARIES OUTSIDE INVESTORS OWNERSHIP RIGHTS OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS PAYMENT OF DIVIDENDS POLITICAL ECONOMY POTENTIAL DEBT PRIVATE PROPERTY PRIVATIZATION LAW PROCUREMENT PROFIT-SHARING PROMISSORY NOTES PROPERTY RIGHTS PROPERTY RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT PROPERTY TAX PROTECTION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS PROTECTION OF PROPERTY PUBLIC DEBTS REINVESTMENT REORGANIZATION RETURN RETURNS RIGHT OF APPEAL RIGHTS OF APPEAL RULE OF LAW SALE OF ASSETS SECONDARY MARKETS SECURITIES SECURITIES MARKET SECURITIES MARKET DEVELOPMENT SETTLEMENTS SHARE CAPITAL SHARE IN OWNERSHIP SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS SHAREHOLDERS SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS STOCKS SUPERVISORY BOARDS SUPERVISORY POWERS TAX TAX ARREARS TAX COLLECTIONS TAX DEBT TAX DEBTS TAX REVENUE TAX REVENUES TAX TREATMENT THREAT OF BANKRUPTCY TITLES TRADE CREDIT TRADE UNION TRADE UNIONS TRANSACTION TRANSFER AGENTS TRANSITION COUNTRIES TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY TURNOVER UNENFORCEABILITY VALUATION VALUATIONS VOUCHER PRIVATIZATION
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/01/17591979/politics-russian-enterprise-reform-insiders-local-governments-obstacles-restructuring http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16980

Description
Summary:	Russia and other countries in the commonwealth of independent states that have implemented voucher privatization programs have to account for the puzzling behavior of insiders manager-owners-who, in stripping assets from the firms they own, appear to be stealing from one pocket to fill the other. This article suggests that asset stripping and the absence of restructuring result from interactions between insiders and subnational governments in a particular property rights regime, in which the ability to realize value is limited by uncertainty and illiquidity. As the central institutions that govern the Russian economy have ceded their powers to the provinces, regional and local governments have imposed a variety of distortions on enterprises to protect local employment. To disentangle these vicious circles of control, this article considers three sets of institutional changes: adjustments to the system of fiscal federalism by which subnational governments would be allowed to retain tax revenues generated locally; legal improvements in the protection of property rights; and the provision of mechanisms for restructuring and ownership transformation in insider-dominated firms. The aim of these reforms would be to change the incentives that local governments, owners, and investors face; to convince subnational governments that a more sustainable way of protecting employment lies in protecting local investment; to raise the cost of theft and corruption by insiders and local officials; and to allow investors to acquire controlling stakes in viable firms.

The Politics of Russian Enterprise Reform : Insiders, Local Governments, and the Obstacles to Restructuring

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