Intrinsic Motivation, Effort and the Call to Public Service
Pay schemes in the public sector aim to attract motivated, high-ability applicants. A nascent literature has found positive effects of higher pay on ability and no or slightly positive effects on motivation. This paper revisits this issue with a no...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/12/18682614/intrinsic-motivation-effort-call-public-service http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16945 |
| Summary: | Pay schemes in the public sector aim to
attract motivated, high-ability applicants. A nascent
literature has found positive effects of higher pay on
ability and no or slightly positive effects on motivation.
This paper revisits this issue with a novel subject pool,
students destined for the private and public sectors in
Indonesia. The analysis uses dictator games and real effort
tasks to examine wage effects on a measure of motivation
that exactly matches the mission of the public sector task.
The model and experimental design allow for precisely
measuring (1) the distribution of ability over the effort
task; (2) the distribution of motivational preferences for
public sector missions; and (3) outside options when
choosing to work for public sector missions. Three novel
conclusions emerge. First, more pro-social workers do, in
fact, exert higher effort in a pro-social task. Second, in
contrast to previous research, motivated individuals are
more likely to join the public sector when public sector pay
is low than when it is high. Third, real public sector
workers exhibit greater pro-sociality than private sector
workers, even for entrants into the Indonesian Ministry of Finance. |
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