Getting Incentives Right : An Impact Evaluation of District Hospital Capitation Payment in Vietnam
With the movement toward universal health coverage gaining momentum, the global health research community has made significant efforts to advance knowledge about the impact of various schemes to expand population coverage. The impacts on efficiency...
Main Authors: | , , , |
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Language: | English en_US |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/11/18533462/getting-incentives-right-impact-evaluation-district-hospital-capitation-payment-vietnam http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16904 |
Summary: | With the movement toward universal
health coverage gaining momentum, the global health research
community has made significant efforts to advance knowledge
about the impact of various schemes to expand population
coverage. The impacts on efficiency, quality, and gaps in
service utilization of reforms to provider payment methods
are less well studied and understood. The current paper
contributes to this limited knowledge by evaluating the
impact of a shift by Vietnam's social health insurance
agency from reimbursing hospitals on a fee-for-service basis
to making a capitation payment to the district hospital
where the enrollee lives. The analysis uses panel data on
hospitals over the period 2005-2011 and multiple
cross-section data sets from the Vietnam Household Living
Standards Surveys to estimate impacts on efficiency,
quality, and equity. The paper finds that capitation
increases hospitals' efficiency, as measured by
recurrent expenditure and drug expenditure per case, but has
no effect on surgery complication rates or in-hospital
deaths. In response to the shift to capitation, hospitals
scaled down service provision to the insured and increased
provision to the uninsured (who continue to pay
out-of-pocket on a fee-for-service basis). The study points
to the need to anticipate the intended and unintended
effects of any payment reform and the trade-offs among
policy objectives. |
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