Do Elected Councils Improve Governance? Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan
Using data from a field experiment in 500 villages, this paper studies how local institutions affect the quality of governance, as measured by aid distribution outcomes. In villages where elected councils exist and manage distributions, aid targeti...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2013
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/06/17928979/elected-councils-improve-governance-experimental-evidence-local-institutions-afghanistan http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15869 |
| Summary: | Using data from a field experiment in
500 villages, this paper studies how local institutions
affect the quality of governance, as measured by aid
distribution outcomes. In villages where elected councils
exist and manage distributions, aid targeting improves.
However, if the distribution is not clearly assigned to
either the council or customary leaders, the creation of
elected councils increases embezzlement and makes
decision-making less inclusive. Requiring that women manage
the distribution jointly with customary leaders also
increases embezzlement. Thus, while elected councils can
improve governance, overlapping mandates between new and
existing institutions may result in increased rent-seeking. |
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