Incomplete Enforcement of Pollution Regulation : Bargaining Power of Chinese Factories
Only a small number of studies have empirically examined the determinants of the monitoring and enforcement performed by environmental regulators, and most of these have focused on industrial countries. In contrast, the authors empirically examine...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2013
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/01/1687150/incomplete-enforcement-pollution-regulation-bargaining-power-chinese-factories http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15751 |
| Summary: | Only a small number of studies have
empirically examined the determinants of the monitoring and
enforcement performed by environmental regulators, and most
of these have focused on industrial countries. In contrast,
the authors empirically examine the determinants of
enforcement in China. More precisely, they analyze the
determinants of firms' relative bargaining power with
local environmental authorities with respect to the
enforcement of pollution charges. The authors show that
private sector firms appear to have less bargaining power
than state-owned enterprises. Contrary to earlier findings,
they also show that firms facing adverse financial
situations have more bargaining power than other firms and
are more likely to pay smaller pollution charges than they
should be paying. Finally, the authors show that the greater
the social impact of a firm's emissions (as measured by
complaints), the less bargaining power it has with local
environmental authorities. |
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