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Market Access for Sale: Latin America's Lobbying for U.S. Tariff Preferences

This paper assesses the foreign lobbying forces behind the tariff preferences that the United States grants to Latin American and Caribbean countries. The basic framework is the one developed that is extended to explain the relationship between for...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Kee, Hiau Looi, Olarreaga, Marcelo, Silva, Peri
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, D.C. 2013
Subjects:
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
AGRICULTURE
ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES
CENTRAL AMERICA
CONSUMER SURPLUS
CONSUMERS
DEMOCRACY
DICTATORSHIP
DOMESTIC MARKET
DOMESTIC PRODUCERS
DUMPING
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
ECONOMIC FACTORS
ELASTICITY
EMPIRICAL STUDIES
EQUILIBRIUM
EXHAUSTIVE DISCUSSION
EXPENDITURES
EXPORT GROWTH
EXPORTERS
EXPORTING COUNTRIES
EXPORTING COUNTRY
EXPORTS
FISHING
FOREIGN EXPORTERS
FOREIGN PRODUCERS
FREE TRADE
FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
FREE TRADE AREA
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
IMPORTING COUNTRY
IMPORTS
INCOME
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LATIN AMERICAN
LEGISLATION
LOBBYING
LOBBYISTS
MARKET ACCESS
MINIMIS LEVEL
NATIONALS
NON-TARIFF BARRIERS
POLICY INSTRUMENTS
POLITICAL ECONOMY
PREFERENTIAL ACCESS
PREFERENTIAL AGREEMENTS
PREFERENTIAL TARIFF
PREFERENTIAL TARIFF REGIME
PRODUCER SURPLUS
PRODUCERS
QUOTAS
SOUTH AMERICA
SOUTH AMERICAN
SUBSTITUTION EFFECT
TARIFF BARRIERS
TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS
TARIFF PREFERENCE
TARIFF PREFERENCES
TARIFF RATES
TARIFF REDUCTIONS
TARIFF REVENUE
TRADE BARRIERS
TRADE ISSUES
TRADE POLICIES
TRADE POLICY
TRADE PREFERENCES
TRADING PARTNERS
UTILITY FUNCTION
WELFARE FUNCTION
WORLD TRADE
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/01/5296837/market-access-sale-latin-americas-lobbying-tariff-preferences-market-access-sale-latin-americas-lobbying-tariff-preferences
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14206
Description
Summary:This paper assesses the foreign lobbying forces behind the tariff preferences that the United States grants to Latin American and Caribbean countries. The basic framework is the one developed that is extended to explain the relationship between foreign lobbying and tariff preferences. Results suggest that returns to Latin American and Caribbean exporters lobbying for tariff preferences in the United States are around 50 percent. The reason for these large returns is the relatively low estimated weight given to social welfare in the U.S. government's objective function when deciding whether or not to grant tariff preferences to Latin American and Caribbean exporters.

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