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The Political Economy of Deposit Insurance

The author uses a political economy framework to analyze cross-country differences in deposit insurance coverage. He finds supporting evidence of the significance of private interest theories in explaining coverage of deposit insurance. Deposit ins...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Laeven, Luc
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, D.C. 2013
Subjects:
ACCOUNTABILITY
BANK CAPITAL
BANK DEPOSITS
BANK REGULATION
BANK RISK
BANK SIZE
BANKING INDUSTRY
BANKING STRUCTURE
BANKING SYSTEM
BANKING SYSTEMS
BANKS
BRANCH BANKING
CAPITALIZATION
CENTRAL BANKS
COALITION GOVERNMENTS
COMMERCIAL BANKS
COMPETITIVENESS
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
CREDIT UNIONS
DEPOSIT INSURANCE
DEPOSIT INSURANCE COVERAGE
DEPOSIT INSURANCE PREMIUMS
DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES
DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEMS
DEPOSITOR PROTECTION
DEPOSITORS
DEPOSITS
ECONOMICS
FINANCIAL CRISIS
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
FINANCIAL SERVICES
FINANCIAL STABILITY
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
FISCAL POLICY
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP
INSURANCE ACTIVITIES
INSURANCE AGENCIES
INSURANCE COMPANIES
INSURANCE DESIGN
INSURANCE INDUSTRY
INSURANCE LIMITS
INSURANCE POLICIES
INSURANCE PRODUCTS
INSURANCE REGULATION
INTERNATIONAL BANKS
LAWS
LEGAL PROTECTION
LIQUID ASSETS
MORAL HAZARD
NONPERFORMING LOANS
PRIVATE BANKS
PUBLIC DEBT
RATES
RISK OF BANK FAILURE
SAVINGS
SHAREHOLDERS
SMALL BANKS
SOCIAL SECURITY
SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS
STOCK MARKETS DEPOSIT INSURANCE
DEPOSITORS SAFETY
FOREIGN BANK ACCOUNTS
CONFIDENCE IN BANKS
PROXY
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/03/4066087/political-economy-deposit-insurance
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14121

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