Fiscal Responsibility Laws for Subnational Discipline: The Latin American Experience

This paper discusses fiscal responsibility laws in Latin America, with special attention to their provisions for fiscal discipline by subnational governments. It discusses why and when such laws might be useful-to help resolve the coordination prob...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Webb, Steven B.
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, D.C. 2013
Subjects:
TAX
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/05/4966775/fiscal-responsibility-laws-subnational-discipline-latin-american-experience
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14034
Description
Summary:This paper discusses fiscal responsibility laws in Latin America, with special attention to their provisions for fiscal discipline by subnational governments. It discusses why and when such laws might be useful-to help resolve the coordination problem in getting diverse governments to avoid overusing the common national credit market and to help individual governments make a time-consistent commitment for fiscal prudence. It examines the cases of Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Argentina, as well as the case of Mexico where other types of laws and regulations aim to achieve the same objectives of solidifying incentives for fiscal discipline at all levels of government. Fiscal responsibility laws are found to be useful in some cases, although the experience is not long enough to be certain, but they are clearly not necessary in every case, nor always sufficient to assure fiscal stability.