The Case for Tradable Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement
In response to concerns over the efficacy of the WTO dispute settlement system, especially in regard to its use by developing countries, Mexico has tabled a proposal to introduce tradable remedies within the Dispute Settlement Understanding. The id...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, D.C.
2013
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/05/4976717/case-tradable-remedies-wto-dispute-settlement http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14017 |
| Summary: | In response to concerns over the
efficacy of the WTO dispute settlement system, especially in
regard to its use by developing countries, Mexico has tabled
a proposal to introduce tradable remedies within the Dispute
Settlement Understanding. The idea is that a country that
has won cause before the WTO, and who is facing
non-implementation by the author of the illegal act but
feels that its own capacity to exercise its right to impose
countermeasures is unlikely to lead to compliance, can
auction off that right. The attractiveness of this idea is
that it offers an additional possibility to injured WTO
members to get something from the dispute settlement
mechanism without putting into question the legal nature of
the existing contract, that is, the predominantly
decentralized system of enforcement in the WTO. Examining
all disputes brought to the WTO since its inception, the
authors find some support for Mexico's perception that
developing countries face a practical problem when they
attempt to carry through with effective retaliation within
the WTO system. And based on the formal results of Bagwell,
Mavroidis, and Staiger (2003), they describe arguments that
lend some support to the efficacy of Mexico's proposed
solution from the perspective of formal economic theory. |
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