Incentives and the Role of Institutions in the Provision of Social Safety Nets
The institutional environment can determine the effectiveness and efficiency of social safety net programs. An otherwise perfectly designed program may fail if it does not take into account the role of the different institutional actors, and the in...
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| Language: | English |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/01/6240288/incentives-role-institutions-provision-social-safety-nets http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11818 |
| Summary: | The institutional environment can
determine the effectiveness and efficiency of social safety
net programs. An otherwise perfectly designed program may
fail if it does not take into account the role of the
different institutional actors, and the incentives they face
in the implementation and delivery of the program. Thus,
incentive structures-between sponsors (i.e., governments)
and providers, and between providers and their clients-play
an important role in determining the success of a social
safety net program. The biggest challenges in countries with
fully developed institutions tend to be: 1. Optimizing
program mix: With many and very sophisticated programs, it
is crucial to determine the 'right' program mix
and reduce overlap and conflicts between social programs.
Regular monitoring and evaluation play a central role in
achieving this. 2. Deciding on the degree of devolution:
Local authorities can be better informed and more
accountable to their local constituencies. Nevertheless, the
devolution of certain policy decisions not only requires a
certain level of capacity at the local level, but must also
be based on an explicit, clearly defined contract between
the central and local governments. |
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